REPUBLIC OF KENYA

The Annual Report

to

Parliament

on the

State of National Security

By

His Excellency

Hon. William Samoei Ruto, PhD., C.G.H.

President of the Republic of Kenya and Commander-in-Chief of the Defense Forces

(Submitted pursuant to Article 240(7) of the Constitution of Kenya 2010 and Section 16 of the National Security Council Act)

SEPTEMBER 2026

FOREWARD

Hon. William Samoei Ruto, PhD., C.G.H.

President of the Republic of Kenya and Commander-in-Chief of the Defense Forces

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

This Annual Report on the State of National Security covers the period from 1st September, 2025 to 31st August, 2026. The report is submitted to the National Assembly in accordance with Article 240 (7) of the Constitution of Kenya and Section 16 of the National Security Council (NSC) Act. It outlines the prevailing and emerging threats to national security and the Government' s strategic responses.

During the period under review, the Country contended with security threats–ranging from organised criminal gangs, drug and substance abuse, illegal aliens and undocumented immigrants, trade in contraband and counterfeit goods, Sexual and Gender-Based Violence (SGBV), road traffic accidents, illegal gaming and gambling, terrorism and violent extremism, money laundering, and cybercrimes. Additionally, insecurity in learning institutions, proliferation of illicit Small Arms and Light Weapons (SALW), cattle rustling and stock theft, Illegal, Unreported and Unregulated (IUU) fishing and transnational crimes complicated internal security efforts.

The Government has taken a series of coordinated and strategic interventions, notably intelligence-led operations and sustained crackdowns on criminal gang members, resulting in arrest, prosecution and disruption of gang mobilisation and networks. Community Policing Initiatives, engagement with local leadership and stakeholders have encouraged timely reporting of gang-related incidents, improving collaboration with law enforcement agencies and identifying and addressing the root causes of gang recruitment and social vulnerabilities.

The country' s food security situation remains relatively fragile, driven by erratic weather patterns, food inflation, and disruptions in the supply of subsidised fertilisers. The anticipated El Niño phenomenon may also heighten the risk of flooding during the

October-December short rains season, with implications for food insecurity. The Government has undertaken efforts to enhance Strategic Food Reserves for better storage to avoid post-harvest waste, providing microfinance credit services to smallholder farmers, and easing farmers' access to driers to avert post-harvest losses.

Efforts to combat drug and substance abuse, especially among the youth, were reinforced through targeted operations that yielded numerous seizures, closing illegal outlets and launching national awareness and rehabilitation programmes. Illicit brews in Kenya still represent a complex and pervasive challenge, with far-reaching socio-economic, security and health implications. Alcohol abuse has continued to undermine livelihoods, jeopardise governance and is being associated with criminal activities.

Human trafficking, undocumented immigrants, and the proliferation of illicit Small arms and Light Weapons (SALW) remained a concern during the period under review. The Government responded through enhanced border surveillance, targeted disarmament operations, and the establishment of the Counter Organised Immigration Crimes Unit within the National Police Service.

Cybercrime has continued to pose significant risks to Government entities, institutions and individuals. In response, the Government has instituted legal and policy reforms, enhanced digital forensic capacity and established the National Cybersecurity Agency (NCSA).

Sexual and Gender-Based Violence (SGBV) decreased by 1.2% nationally during the reporting period. Nairobi recorded the highest number of cases with a total of 495 cases.

Conversely, Bungoma and Kiambu Counties saw a significant reduction in cases reported at 27% and 24% respectively.

Cattle rustling and banditry incidents were reported in various parts of the country, mainly in the North Rift, Upper Eastern and parts of Northern Kenya. The period recorded 94 fatalities, 108 injuries and the theft of over 22,885 heads of livestock, underscoring the scale of the threat. The practice has evolved into organised crime, prompting the Government to undertake multi-agency approaches to address it, which successfully led to the recovery of 15,697 livestock and arrest of 354 suspects.

Unrest in institutions of learning poses a serious threat to the education sector, leading to disruption of learning, destruction of property and loss of life, with 488 institutions affected during the period, a 36% increase over the previous year. In response, the Government established a multi-stakeholder team to investigate the causes and recommend lasting solutions.

The country continued to contend with threats emanating from the external environment, including global economic shocks and spill-over effects of regional conflicts. In response, the Government put in place measures aimed at safeguarding the country against the shocks while bolstering the country' s role in providing leadership and diplomatic support for regional peace and stability.

The Government has further instituted cross-cutting measures to address threats to the country' s security including: National Youth Opportunities Towards Advancements (NYOTA) and other empowerment programmes, legislative and policy reforms, *Jukwaa la Usalama*, establishment of Nairobi Metropolitan Police (NMP), election preparedness, and Beyond Vision 2030 Economic Transformation Plan, among others.

During the period under review, Kenya' s transformative development remained anchored on the Bottom-Up Economic Transformation Agenda (BETA), a comprehensive framework designed to achieve inclusive growth, equitable development and long-term national resilience, committed to addressing the socio-economic drivers of insecurity through youth empowerment programmes, social protection programmes, community engagement and investment in infrastructure development in underserved areas.

ACRONYMS AND ABBREVIATIONS

ACA	Anti-Counterfeit Authority
AI	Artificial Intelligence
AML	Anti-Money Laundering
APCs	Armoured Personnel Carriers
ARVs	Anti-Retroviral drugs
ASALs	Arid and Semi-Arid Lands
ASTU	Anti-Stock Theft Unit
ATMIS	African Union Transition Mission in Somalia
AUSSOM	African Union Support and Stabilization Mission in Somalia
BMUs	Beach Management Units
CBO	Community Based Organization
CCTV	Closed Circuit Television
CEDAW	Convention on Elimination of all forms of Discrimination Against Women
CSO	Civil Society Organization
CVE	Countering Violent Extremism
DCI	Directorate of Criminal Investigations
DRC	Democratic Republic of the Congo
EAC	East African Community
FATF	Financial Action Task Force
FGM	Female Genital Mutilation
FRC	Financial Reporting Centre
GSU	General Service Unit
IC3	Internet Crime Complaint Center
IC4	Integrated Command, Control, Communication and Coordination
ICT	Information and Communications Technology

IEBC	Independent Electoral and Boundaries Commission
IED	Improvised Explosive Device
IGAD	Intergovernmental Authority on Development
IMO	International Maritime Organisation
IRCK	Inter-Religious Council of Kenya
IUU	Illegal, Unreported and Unregulated
JKIA	Jomo Kenyatta International Airport
KDF	Kenya Defence Forces
KEBS	Kenya Bureau of Standards
KNFP	Kenya National Focal Points for Small Arms and Light Weapons
KRA	Kenya Revenue Authority
MDAs	Ministries, Departments and Agencies
MRC	Mombasa Republican Council
NCAS	National Cybersecurity Agency
NCTC	National Counter Terrorism Centre
NEMA	National Environment Management Authority
NGAAF	National Government Affirmative Action Fund
NGAOs	National Government Administrative Officers
NGAPU	National Government Administration Police Unit
NMPU	Nairobi Metropolitan Police Unit
NPS	National Police Service
NSC	National Security Council
NYOTA	National Youth Opportunities Towards Advancement
OB	Occurrence Book
OLA	Oromo Liberation Army
PBO	Public Benefit Organizations

PCVE	Preventing and Countering Violent Extremism
POEs	Points of Entry
PSVs	Public Service Vehicles
RDU	Rapid Deployment Unit
SACCOs	Savings and Credit Cooperative Organizations
SALWs	Small Arms and Light Weapons
SDG	Sustainable Development Goal
SGBV	Sexual and Gender-Based Violence
SHA	Social Health Authority
SHIF	Social Health Insurance Fund
SOG	Special Operations Group
TFGBV	Technology-Facilitated Gender-Based Violence
TWG	Technical Working Group
WAM	Weapons and Ammunition Management
WEF	Women Enterprise Fund

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CHAPTER ONE: INTRODUCTION

The Annual Report on the State of National Security is submitted to the National Assembly in line with Article 240 (7) of the Constitution of Kenya and Section 16 of the National Security Council (NSC) Act. It outlines the prevailing and emerging threats to national security, achievements and challenges encountered, as well as prioritised strategies aimed at consolidating a secure environment that supports Kenya's broader development goals.

Article 238 of the Constitution of Kenya (2010) defines National Security as the protection against internal and external threats to Kenya's territorial integrity and sovereignty, its people, their rights, freedoms, property, peace, stability, prosperity, and other national interests.

During the period under review, Kenya's security environment remained generally stable. However, an interplay of complex and evolving security challenges in the international system, including the spillover effects of global economic shocks, as well as regional instability directly impacted on the domestic security posture. In context, intensified great-power competition sustained strategic rivalry, heightening Kenya's exposure to external shocks that primarily threatened food and energy security through elevated commodity price volatility, supply-chain disruptions and financial pressures in the global markets. Further, instability in parts of the Horn of Africa, the changing tactics of terrorist groups, and the increasing overlap of terrorism with other organised crime continued to strain our borders.

Nationally, the country also contended with persistent security threats including activities of organised criminal gangs, proliferation of Small Arms and Light Weapons (SALWs), incidents of banditry and cattle rustling, cases of gender-based violence and missing children, the threat of religious extremism, human and drug trafficking networks, and the challenges presented by a growing youth population. There was also notable misuse of online platforms, specifically in relation to misinformation and disinformation; recruitment into organised criminal groups; fraud, and coordination of civil unrest which resulted in

loss of life, destruction of property, and disruption of economic activities across the country.

Moreover, climate variability compounded internal security dynamics by generating ripple effects through displacement of populace, resource-based conflicts, food-prices inflation and loss of livelihoods. Similarly, climate-related hazards, wildlife security concerns and Illegal, Unreported and Unregulated Fishing underscored the impact of environmental stress on national security.

In response to this evolving threat landscape, the Government implemented a pragmatic recalibration of its strategies, focusing on targeted investments in energy diversification and agriculture, while reaffirming Kenya' s leadership in promoting regional peace and stability through active diplomacy and security cooperation. Additionally, security agencies, working through multi-agency teams and in close partnership with the citizenry, sustained pressure on transnational organised criminal networks and strengthened early-warning and response systems, as demonstrated by a reduction in general crime. These efforts were complemented by cross-cutting initiatives such as the *Jukwaa la Usalama* platform, the establishment of the Nairobi Metropolitan Police Unit (NMPU), the National Youth Opportunities Towards Advancement (NYOTA) programme, and the greater recognition and integration of National Government Administrative Village Elders (NGAVE) into grassroots administration.

Since the last reporting period, the Government has made measurable progress. Terror-related fatalities reduced by 39%, following enhanced intelligence, border surveillance, community engagement and the disruption of planned attacks. In addition, multi-agency security operations against organised crime and illicit financial flows have been intensified. The establishment of the National Cybersecurity Agency, public-private collaboration, and system resilience have contributed to the reduction of threat numbers.

Moreover, disarmament operations led to the recovery of illicit arms, while socio-economic programs targeting youth vulnerability have mitigated their link to criminal activities. These objectives were achieved by prioritising security agencies' budgets to strengthen capabilities, as well as regional and international security collaboration. Furthermore, the Government has enacted a range of policies and legislative initiatives to enhance the national security environment.

The evolving nature of security threats, characterised by Brittle, Anxious, Non-linear, and Incomprehensible (BANI) operating environment, necessitated adaptation strategies by government through continuous professional development, technological advancement, inter-agency coordination and pre-emptive approaches.

I therefore submit the 2025/2026 Annual Report on the State of National Security.

CHAPTER TWO: NATIONAL SECURITY THREATS

1.0 INTRODUCTION

During the period between 1st September 2025 and 31st August 2026, the country contended with various security threats, including: organised criminal gangs, social unrest, kidnapping and abductions, drug and substance abuse, illicit brews, homicide cases, illegal aliens and undocumented immigrants, trade in contrabands and counterfeit goods, Sexual and Gender-Based Violence (SGBV) and femicide. Further, the period experienced road traffic and aviation accidents, boda boda sector related incidents, gaming and gambling, terrorism and violent extremism, religious extremism, money laundering and terrorism financing, cybercrimes, insecurity in learning institutions, proliferation of illicit Small Arms and Light Weapons (SALW), cattle rustling and stock theft, Illegal, Unreported and Unregulated (IUU) fishing and transnational crimes.

1.1 GENERAL CRIME

Crime remains a significant concern in Kenya and is prevalent in both urban and rural areas. The types of crime commonly reported range from violent crimes, such as armed robbery and assault, to non-violent crimes, including theft, fraud and cybercrime. During the period under review, a total of 97,946 cases were reported between September 2025 and August 2026, compared to 97,366 cases during the corresponding period in 2024/2025, representing an increase of 580 cases or 0.6%.

Overall, an increase in crime rates was recorded in most categories of offences except offences against morality, offences against other persons, breakings, stealing, theft by servant, dangerous drugs, corruption and offences involving tourists, as illustrated in Table 1 below.

Table 1: Comparative Crime Figures

CATEGORY	SEP 2024 - AUG 2025	SEP 2025 - AUG 2026	VAR	% VAR
Homicide	2806	2814	**8**	**(11.7)**
Offences against morality	7247	6919	**-328**	**(13.3)**
Other offences against persons	24531	23564	**-967**	**(0.5)**
Robbery	3428	3549	**121**	**(20.3)**
Breakings	5350	4654	**-696**	**(1.8)**
Theft of stock	2336	2430	**94**	**(25.8)**
Stealing	16763	16161	**-602**	**(0.04)**
Theft by servant	1502	1499	**-3**	**(2.0)**
Vehicle and other thefts	1291	1321	**30**	**(10.1)**
Dangerous drugs	7079	6949	**-130**	**(0.3)**
Traffic offences	119	141	**22**	**18.48**
Criminal damage	5108	5180	**72**	**5.8**
Economic crimes	4359	4655	**296**	**(0.3)**
Corruption	92	80	**-12**	**(12.0)**
Offences involving police officers	237	248	**11**	**3.8**
Offences involving tourist	46	37	**-9**	**(19.56)**
Other Penal Code offences	15072	17745	**2673**	**3.8**
TOTAL	**97366**	**97946**	**580**	**0.6**

To address this menace, the Government has been undertaking a range of measures to curb crime and enhance public safety. These efforts focused on strengthening law enforcement, community involvement, technological advancement, security sector reforms and socio-economic strategies, including:

a) Developing six draft legislations to guide reforms in the security sector: The National Police Service Act (amendment) Bill 2025, The Independent Policing Oversight Authority Act amendment Bill 2025, The National Police Service Commission Act (amendment) Bill 2025, Public Order Act (amendment) Bill 2025, The National Police Service Veteran and Fallen Heroes Bill 2025 and National Forensic Science Bill 2025.
b) Developing draft National Policing Policy, Community Policing Policy and Public Order Management Policy, all which have undergone stakeholder engagement.
c) Establishing Nairobi Metropolitan Police Unit (NMPU) to deliver integrated, coordinated and responsive policing services to enhance public safety, police visibility, law enforcement and service delivery across the Nairobi Metropolitan Area.
d) Deploying officers to National Government Administration Police Unit (NGAPU) to assist National Government Administration Officers in maintaining law and order at the grassroots level.
e) Enhancing targeted deployment of officers in hotspot areas.
f) Equipping the National Police Service with additional and modernized equipment, including Armoured Personnel Carriers (APCs).
g) Revitalising community policing initiatives to strengthen collaboration between the public and law enforcement, aimed at building trust and increasing crime reporting.
h) Economic empowerment initiatives and employment creation through Affordable Housing Projects, aimed at addressing the root causes of crime, such as youth unemployment.

Despite ongoing efforts, several constraints continue to hinder the effective enforcement of law and order:

a. Mistrust between communities and the Law Enforcement Agencies leading to low public confidence and consequent underreporting of crime.
b. Increased use of social media for criminal purposes, including misinformation, recruitment and coordination of criminal activities.

Going forward, the Government remains committed to ensuring a safe and secure environment conducive to sustainable development by:

a) Recruitment of personnel and acquisition and maintenance of security equipment.
b) Carrying out an audit to map all existing assets and rationalising their deployment.
c) Enhancing public engagement to counter the threats associated with misinformation and disinformation.
d) Fast-tracking pending investigations to rebuild public trust.
e) Rolling out integrated databases for Occurrence Book (OB) records, forensics and case tracking across agencies to reduce paperwork and case loss.
f) Training officers on digital evidence handling and other technical areas in crime management in collaboration with institutions of higher learning and other development partners.
g) Fast-tracking finalisation of the enactment of the pending security-related legislative Bills and Policies.

1.2 ORGANIZED CRIMINAL GANGS

Organised criminal gangs continue to pose a significant threat to national security, public safety, social cohesion and economic development. These groups undermine the rule of law through violent criminal activities, intimidation of communities and exploitation of vulnerable youth by recruiting them into criminal enterprises. The threat is exacerbated by unemployment, political and socio-economic challenges, which make many young

people susceptible to recruitment by organised criminal networks seeking financial gain through illicit activities. Increasingly, the gangs are being used as goons to disrupt political gatherings, for political coercion and intimidation, destroying property, instigating violence and intimidating members of the public in pursuit of political and other vested interests.

Criminal gangs and amorphous goons exist in most parts of the country with 309 recorded criminal gangs, some of which are dormant. Notably, Counties that experienced political intolerance due to utilisation of goons and criminal gangs include: Kisumu, Homa Bay, Migori, Kisii, Busia, Murang' a, Kiambu, Nyeri, Mombasa and Nairobi. Despite sustained targeted operations, criminal gangs capitalised on socio-economic pressures, including unemployment and youth vulnerability to enhance recruitment. This contributed to heightened criminal activities, including robbery, targeted killings, burglary and land fraud as well as extortion, especially within the public transport and construction sectors.

Table 2 below shows the regional mapping of active criminal gangs across the country.

Table 2: Regional mapping of active criminal gangs across the country

S/No.	Region	Active Gangs
i.	Nairobi	Team Kazoo, Mujahideen, Matopeni Mafia, Usiku Sacco, Jeshi ya Allah, Mbogi Genje, Brixton Silent, Colombia Candy, Gaza, Tokyo Mafia, Team Mbogi
ii.	Eastern	G-unit, Jeshi ya Rasia, Gaza and Nkomori
iii.	Rift Valley	Watizedi, Kamiti, Confirm, Barsuliek and Cheptiret Boys; (Zero Block, 1 Blood and Triple G from Kakuma Refugee camp), DNA, Answi, Chafua, Exodus, Isilando, Mbogi Mawe, Mbogi mfalme maziwa, Mbogi ya Andu, Transformers, Wagwana, Usiku sacco, Kata Hema, Organised, Panga boys and Izraimo

iv.	Western	Border Defence Force, Bogi Mawe, Jobless gang, Marachi Republican Council, Fimbo Movement, Jeshi jinga, Jobless boys, Mapangale, 42 brothers, 47 brothers
v.	Nyanza	Darfur, Ofunyu Jerusalem, China Squad, Sungusungu, Chinkororo, Dimbo, Katalang,
vi.	Coast	Empire, Military gang, Wakali Wao, Kitimboni, Zoza Nation, Team Mashamba and Chaka to Chaka, Mombasa Republican Council (MRC), Panga boys, Maandani BC, b13, Mawoza, Wachokozi, Woza, Zakaya, Bugati, Team Kiroro, Team Nati Dread, Team Wakali, Team Langa.
vii.	Central	Mungiki, Gaza, Kamagira

Some of the criminal gangs have presence in multiple counties, demonstrating their extended reach and gravity of the security threats associated with their activities as shown in Table 3 below.

Table 3: Criminal gangs with presence in multiple counties

S/No	Criminal Gangs	Counties
1.	Gaza	Mombasa, Kwale, Nakuru, Kilifi, Isiolo, Machakos, Nairobi, Kiambu, and Kisumu
2.	Mungiki	Nakuru, Machakos, Nairobi, Muranga and Kiambu.
3.	Panga Boys	Kilifi, Kwale and Mombasa
4.	Chafu/Squad Chafu/Gang Chafu	Mombasa, Kwale and Nairobi
5.	42 Brothers	Busia, Bungoma and Kisumu
6.	Wakali Wao	Mombasa, Kilifi, Kwale, Machakos and Nairobi
7.	Sungusungu	Kisii and Nyamira

During the reporting period September 2025 to August 2026, organised criminal gangs remained a significant security concern. Law enforcement agencies recorded 1,316 arrests, compared to 602 arrests during the corresponding period of September 2024 to August 2025, representing an increase of 714 arrests (119%). This increase reflects both intensified security operations and the continued emergence and expansion of criminal gangs. Table 4 below presents the comparative number of arrests made for specific gangs during the reporting period.

Table 4: Comparative Arrests made for Organized Criminal Gangs during the two reporting period

Criminal Gang Analysis Of Sept. 2024 - Aug 2025 and Sept. 2025 - Aug 2026			
Name of the Gang	**Arrested Persons**		**Diff**
	Sept. 2024- Aug 2025	**Sept. 2025- Aug 2026**	
Confirm	14	51	37
Panga Boys	466	604	138
Team Shamba	33	53	20
Mungiki	17	3	-14
Buggati	15	0	-15
Jeshi Jinga	18	4	-14
M23	3	0	-3
B13	8	0	-8
Maandani Bc	4	0	-4
Team Kiroro	7	0	-7
Dna	3	0	-3
Gaza Boys	0	14	14
Jeshi Jinga	0	2	2
Zakaya	0	1	1
Mawoza	0	1	1
Woza	0	46	46
Wachokozi	0	2	2
Mombasa Republican Council	0	14	14
Exodus	0	5	5
Isilando	0	1	1
Mbogi Mfalme Maziwa	0	43	43

Criminal Gang Analysis Of Sept. 2024 - Aug 2025 and Sept. 2025 - Aug 2026			
Name of the Gang	Arrested Persons		Diff
	Sept. 2024- Aug 2025	Sept. 2025- Aug 2026	
Answi	0	12	12
Transformers	0	4	4
Mbogi Ya Andu	0	18	18
Chafua	0	94	94
Wagwana	0	21	21
Mbogi Mawe	0	149	149
Dimbo	0	5	5
Jobless Boys	0	20	20
E-Spy	0	7	7
Tokyo Mafia	0	10	10
Gaza Boys	0	6	6
Unknown	0	7	7
Team Nati Dread	0	47	47
Team Wakali	0	35	35
Team Langa	0	6	6
Katalang	0	7	7
Izraimo	0	1	1
Team Mbogi	14	1	-13
Kamagira	0	5	5
Mapangale	0	11	11
Kapedo Worriors	0	6	6
TOTAL	**602**	**1316**	**714**

To address the threat posed by criminal gangs, the Government has undertaken a series of coordinated and strategic interventions, including:

a. Sustaining intelligence-led, multi-agency security operations in various parts of the country targeting gang leaders and members.

b. Increasing patrols and police presence in crime hotspots.

c. Enhancing surveillance and intelligence collection on gang activities.

d. Strengthening community policing and *Nyumba Kumi* initiatives.

e. Dismantling emerging criminal gangs and their recruitment networks.

f. Investigating and prosecuting financiers and facilitators supporting organised criminal activities.

g. Strengthening accountability within security agencies, including stern disciplinary action against officers and individuals found abetting or participating in criminal activities.

h. Enhancing youth empowerment programs in the country with 10,364 youth and 600 youth leaders sensitised, alongside 51,000 receiving training on social emotional skills, while 91,000 having received first tranche of grants under the NYOTA project.

Despite the efforts, the following challenges have hindered successful disruption of the criminal gangs and goons in the Country:

a. Patronage by some politicians, which is emboldening criminal gangs and sustaining their illegal activities.

b. Continued exploitation of vulnerable populations to join criminal gangs.

c. Sustained proliferation of illicit arms.

d. Mushrooming of new gangs and re-emergence of the already dismantled gangs.

e. Fear of retaliation, resulting in limited intelligence sharing.

f. Cross-County movement of gang members.

g. Exploitation of technological/digital capabilities by gangs for coordination of gang activities.

h. Limited rehabilitation and reintegration programmes.

Going forward, the Government remains committed to addressing the root causes and impact of gang-related crime through the following key measures:

a. Enforcing Political Parties Act, Elections Act (Electoral Code of Conduct), Chapter Six of the Constitution of Kenya, and other relevant legislation to deter politicians from abetting goonism.

b. Enhancing community policing to strengthen the neighbourhood watch system.

c. Enhancing Youth Empowerment Programs to protect vulnerable youth from gang exploitation.

d. Instituting punitive administrative action against Government officials and security personnel abetting activities of criminal gangs and goons.

e. Enhancing monitoring of digital spaces to track and prosecute individuals who use social media to mobilise goons and spread incitement.

f. Conducting targeted multi-agency operations to dismantle gang networks, including financiers, protectors and operational cells.

g. Strengthening intelligence-led policing and surveillance operations.

h. Formulating a policy framework to facilitate centralisation of national database of organised criminal gangs.

i. Improving technological capabilities for monitoring organised crime.

j. Fast-tracking prosecution of gang-related offences to improve deterrence.

k. Strengthening rehabilitation and reintegration programmes for former gang members.

l. Enhancing witness protection to encourage public cooperation.

1.3 POLITICAL THREATS

1.3.1 Political intolerance

The period under review was characterised by heightened political polarisation, growing intolerance across the political divide and sustained efforts by competing political actors to mobilise support against their opponents. Some political actors instrumentalised political violence in parts of the country to project political strength and intimidate opponents. Political realignments organised around ethnicity, together with regional political contestation, threaten to polarise the country and undermine national cohesion ahead of the 2027 General Elections.

The period also witnessed recurring anti-Government protests that continued to overstretch State capacity for public order management. Mobilisation intensified ahead of the J-25 and Saba Saba commemorations, and around protests against the Finance Bill, 2026, high fuel prices and the establishment of an Ebola quarantine facility in Laikipia. Activists and other actors actively coordinated public engagement and protest mobilisation activities. The J-25 and Saba Saba commemorative protests were nonetheless largely subdued, with isolated attempts at disruption, predominantly the barricading of roads within the Nairobi Metropolitan Area.

The trajectory towards the 2027 General Elections is the principal concern. Party primaries, boundary review and voter registration will each concentrate political competition, and the pattern observed during the review period suggests an elevated risk of mobilised violence at those points.

The Government undertook the following measures during the period under review:

a. Security agencies arrested 1,827 individuals, including opportunistic criminal elements attempting to vandalise and loot property and to disrupt socio-economic activity.
b. Intelligence-led, targeted and proportionate crowd policing minimised violence, injury and escalation during demonstrations, while safeguarding the rights of assembly and demonstration under Article 37 of the Constitution.
c. The Government reaffirmed its commitment to reparations for protest victims, releasing Ksh. 2 billion to those affected.

Notwithstanding these efforts, the following challenges continue to constrain the management of political threats:

a. Politicisation of security operations, which is undermining containment of political hooliganism.
b. Public order management capacity that remains overstretched relative to the frequency and geographic spread of protest activity.
c. Rapidly evolving technology, which is complicating Government efforts to monitor and regulate the digital space.

Going forward, the Government will focus on:

a. Civic education on democratic values, human rights, political freedoms and respect for differing opinions.
b. Promoting professional and independent media that provide accurate information and afford different political groups fair opportunity to present their views.
c. Supporting the Independent Electoral and Boundaries Commission in the delivery of credible by-elections and in preparations for the 2027 General Elections.
d. Encouraging political parties and leaders to resolve disagreements through dialogue rather than confrontation.

e. Ensuring that the law is applied evenly, regardless of political affiliation, status or position.
f. Protecting the right to political expression while discouraging speech that incites violence, hatred or discrimination.
g. Promoting digital literacy and responsible use of social media to limit the spread of misinformation, disinformation and politically motivated hate speech.
h. Strengthening public order management capacity ahead of the 2027 electoral cycle.

1.3.2 Hate Speech and Polarisation

Hate speech continues to undermine peaceful coexistence, national cohesion and democratic governance in the country, deepening ethnic divisions and contributing to violence, discrimination and social exclusion. It occurs during political campaigns and public meetings, through traditional media and, increasingly, through social media and online platforms. The consequences are not hypothetical: inflammatory speech was a material contributor to the violence that followed the 2007 General Elections, and to the displacement and destruction of property that accompanied it.

Table 5 below presents the cases investigated by the agencies over the reporting period.

Table 5:Hate Speech Cases Investigated by DCI-NCIC in the reporting period

S/NO	OFFENCE	Sep 25	Oct 25	Nov 25	Dec 25	Jan 26	Feb 26	Mar 26	Apr 26	Jun 26	Jul 26	Aug 26	Total
1.	Ethnic contempt	-	1	2	1	-	1	-	-	1	1	7	**14**
2.	Hate speech	2	2	2	-	-	-	-	-	1	1	5	**13**
TOTAL		**2**	**3**	**4**	**1**	**-**	**1**	**-**	**-**	**2**	**2**	**12**	**27**

Graphically, the proportion of the cases investigated by the DCI and NCIC is presented in the Fig. 1 below.




Figure 1: Proportion of Offences Investigated

The Government employed the following measures to contain the threat:

a. In line with Article 33 of the Constitution of Kenya, the Government continued to monitor political expression and digital content to ensure that it does not constitute hate speech or incitement to violence.
b. Enhanced investigation of public and online rhetoric, resulting in twenty seven (27) recommendations for prosecution, alongside the deployment of appropriate counter-narratives.
c. Reconstitution of the National Cohesion and Integration Commission (NCIC) for effective execution of its mandate.
d. Sustained action against goons and politicians involved in hooliganism, resulting in 1,316 arrests.

e. Streamlined communication on key policies, particularly contentious provisions of the Finance Bill 2026, to counter misinformation and disinformation.
f. Promotion of inter-community dialogue and national cohesion.
g. Encouragement of responsible journalism and media self-regulation.
h. Public education on the dangers and legal consequences of hate speech, supported by digital and media literacy programmes to help citizens identify misinformation and inflammatory content.
i. The DCI-NCIC investigated 27 cases, comprising 14 cases of ethnic contempt and 13 cases of hate speech.

Kenya faces several challenges in controlling hate speech:

a. Rapid spread of content through social media.
b. Difficulty in identifying anonymous users.
c. Use of coded or indirect language, which complicates the evidentiary threshold for incitement offences.
d. Limited jurisdiction over offshore platform operators.
e. Political influence and polarisation.

Going forward, the Government will focus on:

a. Optimising strategic public communication to counter misinformation and disinformation.
b. Enhancing the arrest and prosecution of perpetrators of hate speech and of those abetting the activities of goons and criminal gangs.
c. Strengthening the investigative and prosecutorial capacity of the NCIC.
d. Engaging platform operators on content moderation and expedited takedown of inciting material.

1.4 KIDNAPPING AND ABDUCTION

Kidnapping and abduction have become a security concern, posing significant threats to public safety, national security and the rule of law. These crimes have affected various groups, including children and business persons, manifesting as ransom demands, human trafficking and, at times, business-rivalry-related abductions perpetrated by both strangers and acquaintances.

A regional comparative analysis of kidnappings between September 2024 to August 2025, and September 2025 to August 2026 is summarized in Table 6 below.

Table 6: Regional Comparative Analysis of Kidnappings and Abductions

Region	**Sept 2024 - Aug 2025**	**Sept 2025 - Aug 2026**	**DIFF**	**%DIFF**
Nairobi	5	4	-1	-20
R/Valley	12	19	7	58
Coast	5	3	-2	-40
Eastern	7	8	1	14
Western	2	2	0	0
Nyanza	6	12	6	100
Central	9	10	1	11
North Eastern	6	3	-3	-50
Total	**52**	**61**	**9**	**73**

In response to the growing threat of kidnappings and abductions, the Government has implemented a range of targeted interventions aimed at prevention, swift response and victim support, including:

a. Establishing a specialised Anti-Abduction Unit within the Directorate of Criminal Investigations (DCI) to coordinate investigations and prompt response.

b. Enhancing intelligence gathering and surveillance to identify kidnapping syndicates, monitor criminal activities and thwart planned abductions before they occur.

c. Enhancing Police patrols in crime-prone areas to deter criminal activity and improve public safety.

d. Strengthening investigations and prosecution by expediting the arrest, investigation and arraignment in court of suspects to enhance accountability and deterrence.

e. Improving inter-agency coordination between the security agencies to facilitate timely information-sharing and joint operations.

f. Expanding community sensitisation programmes and anonymous reporting platforms, such as Fichua kwa DCI, to encourage public vigilance and timely reporting.

g. Providing victim support services, including counselling and psychosocial assistance.

h. Increasing monitoring of social media and digital platforms to detect criminal recruitment and mobilization.

i. Conducting public awareness campaigns to educate citizens on personal safety measures, reporting procedures and ways to reduce the risk of kidnapping and abduction.

Despite notable progress, several challenges continue to hinder effective prevention and response by the Government:

a. Inadequate surveillance infrastructure, including limited CCTV coverage and technological resources, hampering investigations.

b. Low public trust in law enforcement agencies, discouraging victims and witnesses from reporting incidents or providing crucial information.

c. Emerging cyber-enabled criminal activities, including online luring and digital extortion, presenting new investigative challenges.

d. Difficulties in tracing perpetrators especially those operating anonymously or across international borders.

Going forward, the Government remains committed to eliminating the threat of kidnapping and abduction by strengthening prevention, response and recovery mechanisms through:

a. Rebuilding public trust in security agencies through transparent investigations, community engagement and consistent communication to dispel misinformation and fear.

b. Expanding IC3 and IC4 surveillance systems and the use of modern technologies such as drones and digital forensic tools.

c. Enhancing inter-agency and inter-state collaboration to effectively track, apprehend and prosecute perpetrators operating across borders.

1.5 MISSING CHILDREN

The increasing number of reported cases of missing children across the country has underscored the need for a coordinated, timely and child-centred response to safeguard

vulnerable children, support affected families and bring perpetrators to justice. A child may disappear after becoming separated from family, running away from home, getting lost, being abducted or being taken for purposes such as trafficking, exploitation, forced labour, sexual exploitation or other criminal activities. Child disappearances result in psychological trauma for the child and family, exposure to physical and sexual violence, trafficking and forced labour, loss of education and social development and increased fear and insecurity within communities.

For the period 1st September 2025 to 30th August 2026, a total of 2,986 children were reported missing to Police Stations across the country. The majority of the reported cases were successfully resolved through Police-led tracing efforts, community support or the voluntary return of the children to their families. A number of cases remain under active investigations, including cases involving children who were regrettably found deceased.

The Government has employed the following measures to address the vice:

a) The members of public have been sensitized to report a missing child to the authority without undue delays to facilitate police obtain photographs and identifying information, interview witnesses, review CCTV where available and investigate the child's last known location.
b) Address the underlying vulnerabilities that expose children to disappearance, such as poverty, school absence and marginalization.
c) Parents and guardians have been urged to escort their children to and from schools to reduce exposure.
d) Strengthened cooperation and information sharing at border points to prevent children from being moved across borders unlawfully.

e) Enhanced investigations to facilitate the recovery of the missing children and also disrupt organised trafficking networks.

However, the following factors have been hindering the Government' s efforts to address the menace:

a. Delayed reporting of missing children.
b. Inadequate CCTV and surveillance coverage in some areas.
c. Cross-border criminal networks.
d. Limited public awareness of trafficking and child-abduction risks.
e. Fear or reluctance to report cases.
f. Online exploitation which is increasingly difficult to detect.

Going forward, the Government will:

a. Enhance investigations into trafficking and organised child-abduction networks.
b. Strengthen surveillance and child-protection measures at transport hubs, border points and other high-risk locations.
c. Increase public education on reporting procedures and child safety.
d. Strengthen support, counselling and family reunification for recovered children.
e. Improve regional cooperation with neighbouring countries where cases involve cross-border movement.

1.6 TERRORISM AND VIOLENT EXTREMISM

Globally, the terrorism threat continues to evolve from centrally directed organisations into more flexible and decentralised transnational networks operating through regional affiliates, lone actors and online radicalisation ecosystems. Ongoing conflicts in the

Middle East, the Red Sea, Sudan, the DRC and other parts of Africa continue to create favourable environments for extremist recruitment, financing, propaganda and arms flows.

Terrorist groups are increasingly leveraging encrypted communications, artificial intelligence-assisted propaganda, cyber capabilities, drones and decentralised financing systems to sustain operations and inspire attacks internationally. Although sustained counter-terrorism pressure has degraded several core terrorist organisations, the threat is becoming increasingly diffuse, technologically adaptive and interconnected with geopolitical instability, organised crime and local governance weaknesses. This evolving global threat environment continues to have an impact on Kenya's national security.

1.6.1 Regional Threat Environment

Regionally, Eastern Africa remains one of Africa’ s most active terrorism theatres, with instability in Somalia continuing to have spill-over effects on Kenya, Ethiopia and Uganda. The transition from the African Union Transition Mission in Somalia (ATMIS) to African Union Support and Stabilisation Mission in Somalia (AUSSOM), coupled with governance challenges in Somalia, has created operational gaps that extremist groups continue to exploit.

Al-Shabaab remains the principal terrorist threat within the region and continues to exploit instability in Somalia to sustain its operations and extend its activities across the region. Alongside Al-Shabaab, Islamic State Somalia has expanded its influence, external recruitment efforts, financing networks and international operational ambitions, increasing the complexity of the regional threat landscape. More broadly, terrorist

networks across Africa are becoming increasingly interconnected through illicit trade, weapons trafficking and transnational criminal networks.

For Kenya, the proximity of the Al-Shabaab operating environment in Somalia, particularly areas bordering North Eastern and Coastal Kenya, continues to present a direct security concern through cross-border infiltration, recruitment, facilitation and the movement of terrorist operatives and materiel.

1.6.2 National Threat Assessment

Kenya continues to face a persistent and adaptive terrorism and violent extremism threat, mainly linked to Al-Shabaab, with heightened risk along the Kenya- Somalia border counties of Mandera, Garissa, Wajir and Lamu, as well as major urban centres including Nairobi and Mombasa. The group retains the capability to conduct Improvised Explosive Device (IED) attacks, ambushes, assassinations, cross-border incursions and attacks on security and civilian infrastructure, supported by decentralised cells, online radicalisation, extremist propaganda, criminal networks and socio-economic grievances.

Emerging radicalisation and violent extremism concerns have also been reported in Nakuru, Nyeri, Siaya, Kisumu, Kakamega and Migori Counties, driven by youth unemployment, political and intercommunal tensions, land disputes, religious manipulation and digital influence platforms. These developments indicate that, while the terrorism threat remains particularly pronounced along the Kenya- Somalia border and parts of the Coast, vulnerabilities to radicalisation and violent extremism extend beyond the traditional high-risk areas.

Overall, the national terrorism threat remains persistent, with Al-Shabaab retaining the intent to conduct asymmetric attacks while exploiting cross-border vulnerabilities, local

facilitation networks, emerging technologies and conditions conducive to radicalisation and recruitment. The evolving nature of the threat therefore requires continued attention to both the immediate terrorist threat and the wider drivers and enablers of violent extremism.

1.6.3 Threat Manifestation and Trends

During the reporting period, thirty-seven (37) terror-related incidents were reported, including twenty-one (21) active shooter incidents, fourteen (14) IED attacks, one (1) kidnapping incident and one (1) foiled Terror attempt. Comparatively, there was a marginal increase of terror incidents as shown in Table 7 below.

Table 7:Table showing comparative analysis of Terror Incidences for Sept 2025-August 2026

COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS FOR PERIOD SEPT 2024-AUGUST 2026				
ACTIVITY	**SEPT 2024- AUG 2025**	**SEPT 2025-AUG 2026**	**DIFF**	**%DIFF**
Active Shooter	13	21	8	61.5
IED	14	14	0	0.0
Kidnapping	6	1	-5	(83.3)
Attempts	0	1	1	100
TOTAL	**33**	**37**	**4**	**12.1**

These attacks affected fifty-seven (57) victims as shown in Table 8 below.

Table 8:Comparative analysis of victims of terror-related incidents for Sept 2025-August 2026

COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS FOR TERRORISM VICTIMS FOR SEPT 2024-AUG 2026				
	SEPT 2024- AUG 2025	**SEPT 2025-AUG 2026**	**DIFF**	**%DIFF**
Killed	24	18	-6	(25)
Injured	63	34	-29	(46)
Kidnapped	6	5	-1	(17)
TOTAL	**93**	**57**	**-36**	**(39)**

Notwithstanding the decline in the frequency and human impact of terror-related incidents, Al-Shabaab activities continued to heighten insecurity along the Kenya-Somalia border, particularly within the North Eastern Region (NER) and the Boni Enclave. The group sustained probing attacks against security establishments, telecommunication masts, power infrastructure, IED ambushes and asymmetric attacks on security vehicles along Main Supply Routes, particularly in Fafi and Lamu East Sub-Counties of Garissa and Lamu Counties, respectively.

Al-Shabaab also continued to conduct reconnaissance of infrastructure projects and non-local settlements, in parts of North Eastern and Coast regions. The group continued to mobilise finances through zakat collection and targeted local administrators and contractors for abduction. During the period, recruitment activities targeting youth also intensified, particularly in Duksis and Madrassas in Ifo I and Hagadera camps within the Dadaab Refugee Complex, as well as parts of Coast Region.

Al-Shabaab returnees within the North Eastern Region remained a threat owing to gaps in the management of defecting militants, presenting opportunities for radicalisation and possible recidivism. The group also continued to exploit inter-clan tensions in Mandera County and Bulla Hawa in Somalia to facilitate alternative conflict-resolution avenues with a view to augmenting support from local communities. It further exploited divisions between the Federal Government of Somalia and Federal Member States, as well as governance deficits within Somalia, to sustain its insurgency.

Overall, while the reporting period recorded a 39% reduction in victims, continued attacks along key mobility corridors, reconnaissance of potential targets, recruitment activities and persistent cross-border insecurity indicate that the terrorism threat remained active.

1.6.4 Threat Projection

The terrorism and violent extremism threat is projected to remain persistent and adaptive, with Al-Shabaab expected to sustain asymmetric attacks targeting security personnel, critical infrastructure, public spaces and transport corridors, particularly in Mandera, Garissa, Wajir, Lamu, Nairobi and Mombasa. The group is likely to continue exploiting border vulnerabilities and regional instability to sustain its operational presence and activities.

The increased use of online radicalisation, covert recruitment networks, IEDs, drone-assisted surveillance and exploitation of socio-economic grievances is likely to sustain violent extremism and decentralised operational cells within the country. Al-Shabaab and Islamic State-linked networks are also expected to strengthen regional collaboration with criminal syndicates and exploit governance gaps, political instability and border vulnerabilities across East Africa.

Overall, the threat is likely to become increasingly decentralised and technologically adaptive, requiring sustained attention to both Al-Shabaab's conventional asymmetric capabilities and its evolving recruitment, facilitation and technology-enabled methods.

Recognising the persistent and evolving nature of the terrorism and violent extremism, the Government employed the following measures aimed at disrupting terrorist networks, enhancing security preparedness and strengthening prevention efforts:

a. Sustained intelligence-led and multi-agency counter-terrorism operations, including enhanced collection, analysis and timely sharing of intelligence among relevant security agencies to identify and disrupt terrorist activities and networks.
b. Enhanced border security through sustained patrols along the Kenya-Somalia border and coordinated operations with regional partners.
c. Strengthened the protection of critical infrastructure through the deployment of advanced surveillance technologies and other intelligence-gathering capabilities.
d. Successfully investigated, arrested and prosecuted terrorist suspects, financiers and facilitators in accordance with the law.
e. Strengthened institutional preparedness and counter-terrorism capabilities through specialised training, security awareness programmes and security risk assessments, targeting public and private sector institutions.
f. Sustained Prevention and Countering Violent Extremism (PCVE) measures to complement security operations through community engagement and counter-radicalisation initiatives targeting vulnerable populations.
g. Expanded the Disengagement, De-Radicalisation, Rehabilitation and Reintegration (DDRR) programmes to facilitate the reintegration of returnees and individuals vulnerable to radicalisation.
h. Strengthened regional and international cooperation on counter-terrorism measures.
i. Implemented targeted socio-economic development initiatives in vulnerable areas, including the construction of roads, schools, health facilities and security infrastructure to address underlying conditions exploited by terrorist groups for recruitment and radicalisation, while strengthening resilience within affected communities.

Despite the measures undertaken the following challenges continued to undermine counter-terrorism efforts:

a. Porous borders which facilitate militant infiltration, movement of weapons and illicit financial flows.
b. Terrorist groups' exploitation of emerging technologies and online platforms to sustain their activities.
c. Socio-economic vulnerabilities and perceived marginalisation which extremist actors exploit.
d. Continued presence of local facilitation networks, sympathisers and proxies.
e. Trust deficit between local communities and law enforcement personnel.
f. Gaps in the management of defecting militants and returnees posing the risk of radicalisation and possible recidivism.

In view of the persistent and adaptive nature of the terrorism and violent extremism threat, the following measures will be prioritised to consolidate the gains made during the reporting period and strengthen national resilience against emerging and evolving threats:

a. Strengthening intelligence-led counter-terrorism operations and multi-agency coordination through enhanced intelligence collection and sharing, coordinated security interventions and disruption of terrorist recruitment, logistical and support networks.
b. Strengthening border security and protection of critical infrastructure and strategic national assets through enhanced border surveillance and coordinated border management.

c. Modernising counter-terrorism capabilities to address evolving tactics and technologies, including through investment in advanced security equipment, surveillance technologies, intelligence collection and analytical systems, cyber-monitoring capabilities, drone detection systems and specialised counter-IED capabilities.
d. Strengthening prevention and counter-radicalisation interventions through sustained community engagement, strategic communication and community-based Prevention and Countering Violent Extremism (PCVE) programmes, with particular focus on vulnerable populations and youth in high-risk areas to build resilience against extremist influence.
e. Strengthening disengagement, rehabilitation and reintegration programmes, particularly for returnees, defectors and individuals vulnerable to radicalisation, to mitigate the risk of recidivism and re-entry into extremist networks.
f. Expanding targeted socio-economic interventions in vulnerable areas, particularly programmes targeting youth and communities susceptible to radicalization.
g. Strengthening the legal and policy framework for preventing and countering terrorism and violent extremism, including fast-tracking the development, enactment and implementation of the Prevention of Violent Extremism Act and strengthening the broader framework for preventive, community-based and non-kinetic counter-terrorism interventions across all levels of Government.
h. Strengthening regional and international counter-terrorism cooperation to address the increasingly transnational nature of terrorism and emerging security risks.

1.7 MONEY LAUNDERING AND TERRORISM FINANCING

Money laundering and terrorism financing present significant risks to the integrity and stability of the country's financial and security systems. Money laundering enables criminals to conceal and integrate proceeds of crime into the legitimate financial system, while terrorism financing sustains networks that orchestrate violence and threaten the safety and well-being of citizens. The integration of laundered and terrorism-related funds into the financial system erodes the rule of law, distorts the economy and undermines national security.

Kenya remains committed to meeting the standards of the Financial Action Task Force (FATF). Following the adoption of Kenya's Mutual Evaluation Report and subsequent processes, FATF placed Kenya on the Grey List in February 2024. This is due to identified strategic deficiencies in the country's Anti-Money Laundering (AML) and Countering the Financing of Terrorism (CFT) framework.

FATF and Kenya subsequently agreed on an Action Plan containing twenty-one (21) action items to be addressed between February 2024 and May 2026. Significant progress was recorded during the reporting period and, as at August 2026, thirteen (13) of the action items had been addressed.

The Government has implemented the following measures to counter money laundering and terrorism financing threats:

a. Enacted the Trust Administration Act, 2026 to strengthen transparency in the regulation of trusts.
b. Designated thirteen (13) terrorism-related individuals under the Targeted Financial Sanctions Regime, pursuant to the United Nations Security Council Resolution 1373.

c. Strengthened the Anti-Money Laundering and Countering the Financing of Terrorism (AML/CFT) framework through the enactment of key legislation and review of national AML/CFT strategies to align with international standards.
d. Enhanced multi-agency operations and collaboration to forge synergy in intelligence collection, investigation and prosecution of money-laundering and terrorism-financing.
e. Enhanced capacity building amongst stakeholders within AML/TF landscape.

The Government' s efforts to fight AML/ CFT are being hampered by the complexity of tracing, freezing and recovering criminal assets.

Going forward, the Government commits to:

a. Fast-track the implementation of the FATF Action Plan and strengthen the AML/CFT legal and regulatory framework to address identified deficiencies.
b. Enhance multi-agency coordination and intelligence sharing to improve the detection, investigation, prosecution and disruption of money laundering and terrorism financing networks.
c. Strengthen forensic, cybercrime and financial investigation capabilities through investment in modern technologies, specialised training and technical capacity.
d. Increase investment in advanced financial intelligence systems and analytical tools to detect suspicious financial transactions and emerging money laundering and terrorism financing risks.
e. Expand collaboration with regional and international partners to facilitate information sharing, joint investigations, asset tracing, recovery and mutual legal assistance.
f. Enforce the enacted Trust Administration Act, 2026.

g. Enhance capacity-building initiatives for stakeholders within the AML/CFT/CPF landscape, particularly in areas where capacity gaps have been identified.

1.8 RELIGIOUS EXTREMISM

Three years after the Shakahola massacre, the full extent of its horror continued to emerge. During the period under review, Police exhumed at least 32 additional bodies at the Shakahola site, raising serious concerns that cult networks operating under the guise of religious practice remain active.

In an effort to address the growing religious fundamentalism the Government through relevant agencies undertook the following interventions:

a. Advanced faith-based PCVE programming, including conducting research studies on religious extremism in the Eastern and Western regions of Kenya leading to the production of the first systematic County-level evidence-based faith-related radicalisation drivers and patterns across these zones.

b. Initiated the Engagement with Religious Extremism and Radicalisation Program, equipping religious leaders with practical tools for early identification, referral and counter-narrative engagement. Eighteen (18) County-Level Working Groups on Faith and Ideology were activated, creating structured sub-national platforms for inter-agency and faith-community coordination on PCVE.

c. Formally launched the Inter-Religious Council of Kenya (IRCK)– NCTC Partnership on PCVE, establishing an institutional channel for collaboration with mainstream Muslim, Christian and inter-faith bodies.

Despite these advances, several structural impediments continued to constrain effective prevention and response. The Religious Organisations Bill attracted significant pushback from mainstream church and Muslim umbrella bodies, who characterised provisions on

registration thresholds, oversight powers and penalties as unconstitutional overreach. Other challenges include:

a. Registration gaps, with a large proportion of small religious formations, including home-based "fellowships" and "study groups" remaining outside the formal registration framework, limiting the reach of regulatory oversight.

b. The migration of extremist and cultic activity to encrypted digital platforms for online indoctrination, recruitment and coordination.

c. Exploitation of the legal personality of registered Community Based Organisations (CBOs), Civil Society Organisations (CSOs), Public Benefit Organisations (PBOs), and private businesses as cover for extremist activity continued to be detected, pointing to inadequate cross-referencing between registration systems and security databases.

d. Demand-side vulnerability remained high, with poverty, unemployment, social marginalisation and inadequate mental health support continuing to create conditions conducive to radicalisation.

Going forward, the Government will:

a. Fast-track the enactment of the Religious Organisations Bill, 2024 and gazettement of the Religious Affairs Commission.

b. Scale the Early Warning and Early Response Programme across additional counties and institutionalise the County-Level Working Groups on Faith and Ideology within the county security governance architecture.

c. Promote evidence-based PCVE interventions and dissemination of relevant information to stakeholders.

d. Support the IRCK- NCTC Partnership on PCVE, expand its scope to cover digital counter-narrative programming and extend structured engagement to additional faith umbrella bodies at both national and county levels.

e. Enhance cross-agency information sharing among relevant stakeholders to close the gap exploited by extremist groups registering as legitimate organizations and accelerate rehabilitation and reintegration support for victims and former members of extremist and cultic groups.

1.9 TRAFFICKING IN PERSONS AND SMUGGLING OF IMMIGRANTS

Kenya continued to contend with trafficking in persons and smuggling of immigrants, with syndicates operating within the country and in neighbouring states, exploiting the country as a source, transit and destination for trafficked and smuggled persons. The menace was partly aided by escalating conflict in some countries in the region, leading to displacement of populations and disruption of socio-economic activities. Trafficking in persons from Ethiopia, Eritrea and Somalia, destined for Libya, Middle East and Europe, persisted. Notably, the smuggling of Ethiopian and Eritrean aliens to South Africa through the country reduced significantly, due to the widespread xenophobic attacks against African migrants in South Africa.

Cases of trafficking in person has been propagated by various motives to wit Domestic servitude/forced labour, Economic exploitation, Sexual exploitation, Illegal adoption, fostering, radicalization, armed conflict recruits or Organ removal. Statistics on cases of trafficking in persons dating from 1st September 2025 to 1st August, 2026 reveal a total of 59 cases handled as tabulated below.

Table 9:Reported Cases of Trafficking in Person

S/NO	OFFENCE	Sep-25	Oct-25	Nov-25	Dec-25	Jan-26	Feb-26	Mar-26	Apr-26	May-26	June-2	July-26	Aug- 26	Total
1.	Human Trafficking	**4**	**5**	**3**	**2**	**5**	**7**	**4**	**3**	**3**	**2**	**1**	**-**	**39**
2.	Smuggling of Immigrants	0	1	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	**0**	**0**	**2**
3.	Child Trafficking	1	0	0	1	1	1	0	0	0	0	4	10	**18**
	TOTAL	**5**	**6**	**3**	**3**	**6**	**8**	**5**	**3**	**3**	**2**	**5**	**10**	**59**

For the period September 2025 to August 2026, a total of 59 cases relating to human trafficking and related offences were recorded.

- Human trafficking: 39 cases (66.1%), making it the most prevalent offence. Cases fluctuated during the period, peaking at 7 cases in February 2026, before declining to zero in August 2026.
- Smuggling of immigrants: 2 cases (3.4%), indicating comparatively low reported incidence during the period.
- Child trafficking: 18 cases (30.5%), representing the second-largest category, with notable increases in July (4 cases) and August 2026 (10 cases).

Human trafficking accounted for approximately two-thirds of all reported cases, while child trafficking constituted nearly one-third. The sharp increase in child-trafficking cases during July- August 2026, particularly the 10 cases recorded in August, is a significant emerging trend requiring enhanced investigation, victim protection, intelligence-led prevention and targeted operations against trafficking networks.

Additionally, proliferation of rogue recruitment bureaus against the backdrop of inadequate enforcement of labour regulations continued to facilitate trafficking of

Kenyans to various destinations, particularly South East Asia, Libya, Middle East and Russia. The rogue agencies continued to capitalise on the prevailing socio-economic challenges to lure unsuspecting individuals mainly through digital platforms, especially TikTok, WhatsApp, Facebook and YouTube.

To address the menace, the Government has employed the following measures:

a) Strengthened enforcement of the Counter-Trafficking in Persons Act, 2010 and the Kenya Citizenship and Immigration Act, 2011.
b) Enhanced border surveillance and management through increased deployment of immigration and security officers, patrols, intelligence gathering, surveillance technology and better monitoring of unofficial crossing points.
c) Conducted multi-agency operations to aid in arresting and prosecuting recruiters, transporters, corrupt facilitators, document forgers and organised criminal networks.
d) Sustained support of the National Assistance Trust Fund for Victims of Trafficking in Persons, to support assistance to trafficking victims.
e) Sustained public education on deceptive job advertisements, suspicious recruitment agents, exploitation of children, forced labour and safe migration procedures. Particular attention is given to border communities, informal settlements, refugee-hosting areas and communities with high levels of labour migration.
f) Strengthened cooperation with neighbouring countries, INTERPOL, UNODC, IOM and other international bodies through intelligence sharing, joint investigations, extradition, mutual legal assistance, victim repatriation and coordinated border operations.

Challenges include:

a) Rogue employment agencies' exploitation of underlying vulnerabilities, such as unemployment, poverty, lack of livelihood opportunities, school dropout, gender-based violence and limited awareness of safe migration.
b) The evolving threat environment including criminal networks' use of technology to facilitate human trafficking and smuggling.

Going forward, the Government will:

a. Strengthen enforcement through licensing, inspection and monitoring of recruitment agencies, and prosecute agencies or individual recruiters involved in fraudulent recruitment.
b. Improve cyber-investigations through collaboration with technology companies where legally appropriate.
c. Strengthen internal accountability, integrity testing, rotation of personnel at vulnerable border points and secure electronic immigration systems to reduce opportunities for corruption.

1.10 DRUGS TRAFFICKING AND SUBSTANCE ABUSE

Drugs trafficking and substance abuse has been identified as a major threat to national security as well as the well-being of citizens with adverse implications on national growth and development. Indeed, there is a direct correlation between drug and substance abuse and increase in crime rates in the country. Kenya is both a major destination and transit point for narcotics, with drugs being trafficked to various destinations, including Southern and Western Africa, Asia, Europe and the Americas.

Kenya is a key destination country for cannabis originating mainly from Ethiopia, Tanzania, Uganda, USA, Portugal and Thailand as shown in Figure 2 below.




Figure 2:Drug trafficking routes

Narco-traffickers have devised subtle ways of smuggling drugs in and out of the country through both gazetted and ungazetted entry points along Kenya's borders with Ethiopia, Tanzania, Somalia and Uganda for onward movement to other countries. Some of these narcotics find their way into the local market, contributing to significant social problems such as addiction, criminal activity and social instability. The vice is predominant in Mombasa, Migori, Kwale, Kilifi, Lamu, Nairobi, Kisii, Isiolo, Marsabit and Garissa, among other counties. Drugs such as cannabis, heroin, cocaine, methamphetamine and other synthetic drugs are trafficked and consumed in these areas.

The illicit drug trade generates substantial proceeds that strengthen organized criminal groups and enable them to diversify into other forms of serious crime, including money laundering, corruption, firearms trafficking, human trafficking, cybercrime and financial crimes. Drug trafficking networks frequently exploit weak border controls, technological advancements, informal financial systems and cross-border criminal collaborations to evade law enforcement agencies.

The drugs impact the youth population in particular, leading to a rise in drug-related crime, health problems and social breakdown. The financial burden on the health sector is considerable, with millions spent annually in treating drug-related conditions.

The prevalent use of drugs and substances among the youth affects not only individual users but also their families and society at large, with effects including neglect of responsibilities, reduced workforce productivity increased criminal activity, organised criminal gangs, interpersonal violence, impaired self-regulation and problem-solving, health impairment (including mental disorders) and reduced life expectancy. In addition, drug trafficking and substance abuse pose significant threats to Kenya's national security by undermining public safety, eroding social cohesion, increasing the burden on the criminal justice and health systems, and compromising sustainable socio-economic development.

The Government has declared drug and substance abuse a serious threat to the country's stability and has sustained nationwide crackdowns. During the period under review, 5,834 persons were arrested in connection with drug related offences (possession, cultivation, and trafficking), 5,800 being Kenyan nationals whereas the rest were foreign nationals as depicted in Table 10 below.

Table 10:Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Summaries for September 2025 to August 2026

TYPE OF DRUG	NO. OF PERSONS ARRESTED	NO. OF MALES ARRESTED	NO. OF FEMALES ARRESTED	NO. OF KENYANS ARRESTED	NO. OF FOREIGNERS ARRESTED	QUANTITY OF DRUG
Heroin	37	31	6	37	0	• 463 sachets • 14.55Kgs
Cocaine	19	15	4	17	2	• 73 Pellets; • 6 Sachets;

TYPE OF DRUG	NO. OF PERSONS ARRESTED	NO. OF MALES ARRESTED	NO. OF FEMALES ARRESTED	NO. OF KENYANS ARRESTED	NO. OF FOREIGNERS ARRESTED	QUANTITY OF DRUG
						• 5.478Kgs
PSYCHOTROPIC SUBSTANCES:						
Cozepam	4	4	0	4	0	333 TABS
Diazepam	6	6	0	6	0	916 TABS
Meth	11	10	0	4	7	1042.792
Ketamine	0	0	0	0	0	6.41 KGS
Cannabis Herbal	5757	5323	435	5732	25	2 Pellets 2,523 Sachets 138 tablets 17,911.49 Kgs 196,005 Rolls 582 Bales 9, 147 Plants 2,408 Brooms 3, 491 Stones
TOTAL	**5,834**	**5,389**	**445**	**5800**	**34**	

Recognising the inherent dangers associated with drug trafficking and abuse, the Government implemented the following measures:

a. Enhanced operational capacity of the National Anti-Narcotics Investigations Bureau by increasing its personnel.

b. Ensured that seized narcotic drugs during operations are securely destroyed in accordance with the law to prevent their re-entry into the illicit supply chain.

c. Enhanced multi-agency approach and stakeholder collaboration through a whole-of-society approach to identify, disrupt, arrest, and prosecute drug trafficking syndicates and their financiers including, the dismantling of trafficking

networks and destruction of illicit narcotic crop plantations in forested and other affected areas.

d. Strengthened border controls and cooperation with regional and international partners, resulting in the arrest, prosecution and deportation of foreign nationals involved in drug trafficking.

e. Enhanced public awareness and advocacy programmes to educate the public on the dangers of drug and substance abuse and promote preventive interventions in the 47 counties where 1.2 million citizens were reached while 4,200 individuals were referred for treatment. Additionally, 188 parenting programs were conducted targeting 50,000 parents, teachers and students.

f. Promoted access to treatment, rehabilitation and reintegration programmes for persons affected by drug and substance use disorders to support their recovery and social reintegration.

Despite the progress made, the Government continues to face the following challenges in addressing drug trafficking and substance abuse:

a. Limited public trust in law enforcement agencies which hampers community cooperation in addressing drug and substance abuse.
b. Social stigma towards drug and substance abuse discouraging affected individuals from seeking psychological and physiological help and intervention.
c. Severe treatment and rehabilitation capacity gap. Kenya faces a critical treatment deficit, with an estimated 2,707,266 people in need of treatment services against a national capacity of less than 10,000 clients per year.
d. Growing normalization, availability and rising use of cannabis among school-going children.

e. Emergence of New Psychoactive Substances which are designed to evade existing drug control laws, making regulation, detection, and enforcement increasingly difficult while posing unknown health risks.
f. The rapid emergence of new synthetic drugs and the use of digital and online platforms for drug trafficking continue to outpace existing legal and regulatory frameworks affecting.
g. High levels of youth unemployment which make young people more susceptible to recruitment by organised criminal networks involved in drug trafficking and related illicit activities.

To consolidate and sustain the gains made in combating drug trafficking and substance abuse, and to safeguard the country from these threats, the Government commits to:

a. Continue strengthening the capacity of security agencies through enhanced joint training and specialized skills development.
b. Enhance coordinated multi-agency operations to effectively combat drug trafficking and abuse.
c. Institutionalize the deployment and use of advanced narcotics and precursor chemical detection technologies, including modern testing kits at all ports of entry, to prevent the importation, manufacture and distribution of illicit drugs.
d. Mainstream drug prevention into national development programmes by prioritising youth employment, skills development, entrepreneurship and mentorship initiatives.
e. Scale up public awareness and advocacy campaigns against drug and substance abuse to promote prevention and encourage early access to counselling, treatment and rehabilitation services.

f. Expand government-supported rehabilitation and aftercare centres across all counties to ensure equitable access to quality treatment, rehabilitation and community reintegration services.

g. Strengthen prevention and protection interventions for school-going children by developing and implementing a multi-sectoral framework bringing together the education, health, social protection, child welfare, security, and community sectors to address the underlying drivers of adolescent substance use.

h. Enhance the national response to synthetic drugs.

i. Establish a National Early Warning System for New Psychoactive Substances.

j. Strengthen regional and international cooperation and policy harmonization.

k. Strengthen forensic and laboratory capacity.

1.11 ILLICIT BREWS AND ALCOHOL ABUSE

Illicit brews and alcohol abuse represent a complex and pervasive challenge with far-reaching socio-economic, security and health implications. The vice undermines livelihoods, jeopardises governance and is associated with criminal activities. Potent ingredients added during the manufacture of illicit brews and alcohol including methanol, herbicides, pesticides, formaldehyde and pharmaceutical drugs, pose serious health risks and are the major causes of illicit-alcohol-related deaths, blindness and other illnesses.

Illicit alcohol is consumed mainly by vulnerable segments of the population, contributing to social instability, addiction and increase crime. The growing demand for illicit alcohol ensures that, despite the risks, production continues, often under unsafe and unregulated conditions. This trend is exacerbated by the commercialised informal alcohol sector, which presents profound challenges from adulterated traditional brews and illicit

second-generation alcohol with greater risks to public health and safety. The distribution networks for illicit brews often fund criminal activities and pose a challenge to law enforcement agencies.

During the period under review, the national crackdown resulted in a decrease in the number of arrests from 7,290 in September 2024 – August 2025 to 6,889 in September 2025 – August 2026 while the amount of liquor netted increased by 170,655 or 28% from 602,160 litres in September 2024 - August, 2025 to 772,815 litres in September 2025- August 2026, as shown in Table 11 below.

Table 11:Illicit Brew Statistics

REGIONS	SEPT 2024 - AUG 2025			SEPT 2025 - AUG 2026			DIFF			% DIFF		
	Persons Arrested	Amount of Liqour Netted	Amount of Liquor Destroyed	Persons Arrested	Amount of Liqour Netted	Amount of Liquor Destroyed	Persons Arrested	Amount of Liqour Netted	Amount of Liquor Destroyed	Persons Arrested	Amount of Liqour Netted	Amount of Liquor Destroyed
Coast	136	13,529	8,410	324	21,374	13,360	188	7,845	4,950	138.	58	59
N/Eastern	23	70	0	24	478	0	1	408	0	4	583	100
Eastern	772	53,326	12,097	510	28,421	4,880	-262	-24,905	-7,217	-34	-47	-60
Central	432	13,980	5,355	341	30,162	12,960	-91	16,182	7,605	-21	116	142
Rift Valley	2,733	243,658	165,750	1,290	116,665	59,040	-1443	-126,993	-106,710	-53	-52	-64
Western	1,151	88,269	62,410	1,517	173,688	124,700	366	85,419	62,290	32	97	100
Nyanza	918	108,418	69,570	1,866	314,360	229,300	948	205,943	159,730	103	190	230
Nairobi	1,125	80,911	70,840	1,017	87,667	64,553	-108	6,756	-6,287	-10	8	-9
TOTAL	**7,290**	**602,160**	**394,432**	**6,889**	**772,815**	**508,793**	**-401**	**170,655**	**114,361**	**-6**	**28**	**29**

Note: The difference in statistics between the netted and destroyed liquor obtains from quantities preserved as exhibit for cases pending before court.

Recognising the need to strike a balance between promoting legitimate trade and safeguarding public health, the Government has undertaken the following measures:

a. Strengthened coordination between National and County Governments to facilitate the inspection of licensed premises and the closure of non-compliant outlets involved in the manufacture or sale of illicit alcoholic beverages.

b. Enhanced multi-agency collaboration to disrupt both the supply and demand of illicit and counterfeit alcoholic products through coordinated enforcement and preventive interventions.

c. Engaged key stakeholders to expand access to treatment, rehabilitation and aftercare services for persons affected by alcohol abuse.

d. Sustained public education and advocacy campaigns to raise awareness of the health, social, and economic consequences of illicit and counterfeit alcoholic drinks and to promote responsible behaviour.

Despite the progress made, the fight against illicit brews and alcohol abuse has continued to face the following challenges:

a. The high cost of regulated alcoholic beverages which sustains demand for cheaper, illicit, and counterfeit alternatives.

b. Gaps in existing legal, policy, and regulatory frameworks, including delayed establishment of Liquor Licensing and Control Boards in some Counties, affecting implementation and enforcement.

c. Lenient penalties for offences related to illicit alcohol, including the classification of certain violations as minor offences, limiting the deterrent effect of enforcement measures.
d. The proliferation of counterfeit alcoholic products and cross-border smuggling of ethanol and other raw materials continues to undermine domestic enforcement efforts.
e. Economic dependence on illicit alcohol trade by some producers and vendors poses socio-economic challenges.

To eliminate illicit brews and counterfeit alcohol and protect the public from their harmful effects, the Government commits to:

a. Strengthen border surveillance and enhance intelligence-led operations to prevent the smuggling of ethanol, counterfeit alcoholic products, and other raw materials.
b. Reinforce multi-agency coordination and collaboration among National and County Governments' agencies to enhance enforcement against non-compliant operators.
c. Expand access to national and county level medical care and support services for individuals affected by alcohol dependency, leveraging on public-private partnerships.
d. Urge County Governments to fast-track establishment of Liquor Licensing and Control Boards.
e. Intensify public awareness and community engagement programmes on the dangers of illicit alcohol and promote community participation in prevention and enforcement efforts.

1.12 SEXUAL AND GENDER-BASED VIOLENCE (SGBV) AND FEMICIDE

Sexual and Gender-Based Violence (SGBV) and Technology-facilitated Sexual and Gender-Based Violence (TFGBV) manifested through image-based abuse, online harassment and doxing, sextortion and coercive control, and high prevalence, including femicide, remains a significant internal security concern due to its increasing threat to public safety, social cohesion, and national stability. The continued prevalence of domestic violence, rape, defilement, and femicide has created widespread insecurity, particularly among women and girls, while undermining constitutional rights and the rule of law. The violence is driven by harmful cultural practices, patriarchal norms, economic vulnerabilities, weak family structures, and institutional gaps that continue to impede prevention, investigation, prosecution, and survivor protection. Failure to address these emerging threats risks escalating violence, weakening public confidence in security institutions, eroding social cohesion, and compromising national security and development objectives.

The data on Sexual and Gender-Based Violence (SGBV) cases across the Counties from September 2025 to August 2026 reflects a 1.2% national decrease in reported cases from 6,813 in a similar period in 2024/2025 to 6,732. Nairobi recorded the highest cases across the two reporting periods, having a total of 407 cases in 2024- 2025 and a fluctuation to the upside during the subsequent period of 2025- 2026, with a total of 495 cases. This resulted to the highest increase of SGBV cases across the country, with 88 cases, followed by Nyamira County, which recorded an increase by 51 cases, with both counties reflecting heightened reporting and potential urban vulnerability.

Counties like Bungoma and Kiambu saw significant reduction in cases reported during the two reporting periods. This fluctuation to the downside translated into a 27% and 24% decrease respectively.

The overall decrease during the two periods standing at 1.2% indicates a positive policy impact, though persistent hotspots like Nairobi, Bungoma and Nakuru underscore the need for targeted county-specific strategies, combining enforcement, awareness and survivor support to sustain progress. Table 12 presents the comparative analysis of the SGBV cases.

Table 12 :Comparative analysis of the SGBV cases

S/No	COUNTIES	SEPT 2024-AUGUST 2025	SEPT 2025-AUGUST 2026	DIFF	%DIFF
1.	Mombasa	244	238	-6	-2.46%
2.	Kwale	126	132	6	4.76%
3.	Kilifi	324	251	-73	-22.53%
4.	Tana River	28	48	20	71.43%
5.	Lamu	49	48	-1	-2.04%
6.	Taita Taveta	91	70	-21	-23.08%
7.	Garissa	81	74	-7	-8.64%
8.	Wajir	35	20	-15	-42.86%
9.	Mandera	30	42	12	40.00%
10.	Marsabit	50	44	-6	-12.00%
11.	Isiolo	41	57	16	39.02%
12.	Meru	188	226	38	20.21%
13.	Tharaka Nithi	50	59	9	18.00%
14.	Embu	129	142	13	10.08%
15.	Kitui	187	155	-32	-17.11%
16.	Machakos	216	213	-3	-1.39%
17.	Makueni	196	149	-47	-23.98%
18.	Nyandarua	84	99	15	17.86%
19.	Nyeri	138	174	36	26.09%
20.	Kirinyaga	86	125	39	45.35%
21.	Muranga	175	176	1	0.57%
22.	Kiambu	368	281	-87	-23.64%
23.	Turkana	63	87	24	38.10%
24.	West Pokot	49	38	-11	-22.45%
25.	Samburu	16	35	19	118.75%

S/No	COUNTIES	SEPT 2024-AUGUST 2025	SEPT 2025-AUGUST 2026	DIFF	%DIFF
26.	Trans Nzoia	119	134	15	12.61%
27.	Uasin Gishu	160	153	-7	-4.38%
28.	Elgeyo Marakwet	44	64	20	45.45%
29.	Nandi	119	104	-15	-12.61%
30.	Baringo	66	64	-2	-3.03%
31.	Laikipia	63	64	1	1.59%
32.	Nakuru	347	301	-46	-13.26%
33.	Narok	136	152	16	11.76%
34.	Kajiado	161	145	-16	-9.94%
35.	Kericho	113	125	12	10.62%
36.	Bomet	184	194	10	5.43%
37.	Kakamega	193	193	0	0.00%
38.	Vihiga	126	94	-32	-25.40%
39.	Bungoma	274	200	-74	-27.01%
40.	Busia	135	183	48	35.56%
41.	Siaya	114	135	21	18.42%
42.	Kisumu	236	229	-7	-2.97%
43.	Homabay	174	139	-35	-20.11%
44.	Migori	208	172	-36	-17.31%
45.	Kisii	282	250	-32	-11.35%
46.	Nyamira	108	159	51	47.22%
47.	Nairobi	407	495	88	21.62%
	TOTAL	**6813**	**6732**	-81	-1.19%

1.12.1 Gender Disparities in Perpetration

The data on SGBV offenses from September 2024 to August 2026 reveals stark gender disparities among accused perpetrators with males overwhelmingly implicated in most crimes. Over the two-year period, male accused persons dominated offenses like defilement and unnatural offenses. Notably, gang-related crimes (rape/defilement) exclusively involved male perpetrators. Overall, male accused numbers fluctuated slightly to the downside (peaking at 6,759 in 2024- 2025 before declining to 6,579 in

2025-2026), translating to a 4% decrease. On the other hand, female accused persons increased drastically from 44 to 199, particularly from domestic cases of threatening to kill and subjecting a child to cruel punishment.

The persistence of male-perpetrated defilement underscores systemic challenges, whereas the low numbers of female accused persons on the same offense suggests gender crime patterns or reporting biases. A comparative analysis of the same is reflected in the Table 13 below.

Table 13:Table showing Comparative SGBV perpetrators

OFFENCES	**SEP 2024-AUGUST 2025**		**SEP 2025-AUGUST 2026**		**DIFF**	
	M	**F**	**M**	**F**	**M**	**F**
Unnatural Offences (Sodomy)	44	0	60	0	16	0
Indecent Act	193	11	230	20	37	9
Sexual Assault	122	7	85	10	-37	3
Rape	900	4	791	17	-109	13
Attempted Rape	17	1	65	4	48	3
Gang Rape	16	0	100	0	84	0
Defilement	5414	5	4947	93	-467	88
Attempted Defilement	7	0	58	1	51	1
Gang Defilement	2	2	40	4	38	2
Subjecting a Child to Cruel Punishment	6	6	15	23	9	17
Child in Need of Care and Protection	0	0	0	0	0	0
Murder(Related to GBV)	11	1	30	12	19	11
Threatening to Kill (Domestically)	27	7	158	15	131	8
TOTAL	**6759**	**44**	**6579**	**199**	**-270**	**-100**

1.12.2 Gender Analysis of SGBV Victims

The data reveals a gendered pattern in SGBV victimization with female victims outnumbering males across nearly all offense categories. Defilement cases consistently affects the largest number of female victims representing 74% of SGBV victims reported in the 12-month period while male victims in this category are below the 100 mark.

Similarly, rape cases predominantly impacted women (778 female victims), demonstrating over 90% female victimization rate. Indecent acts showed a similar trend, with female victims increasing from 190 to 226 cases as compared to just 14 and 24 male victims in the corresponding period. Male victims featured prominently in some categories like unnatural offenses. Notably, female victimization in domestic violence-related offenses (threats to kill) increased from 24 to 36 female accused persons translating into 413% increase during the two reporting periods. Table 14 below presents the Comparative analysis:

Table 14:Table showing a Comparative Analysis of victims of SGBV

OFFENCES	SEPT 2024-AUG UST 2025		SEPT 2025-AUG UST 2026		DIFF	
	M	F	M	F	M	F
Unnatural Offences (Sodomy)	40	4	60	0	20	-4
Indecent Act	14	190	24	226	10	36
Sexual Assault	17	112	6	88	-11	-24
Rape	9	895	33	778	24	-117
Attempted Rape	1	17	3	66	2	49
Gang Rape	0	8	0	47	0	39
Defilement	20	5369	149	4893	129	-476
Attempted Defilement	0	7	0	59	0	52
Gang Defilement	0	2	0	22	0	20
Subjecting a Child to Cruel	3	9	16	22	13	13

OFFENCES	SEPT 2024-AUGUST 2025		SEPT 2025-AUGUST 2026		DIFF	
	M	F	M	F	M	F
Punishment						
Child in Need of Care and Protection	6	14	37	44	31	30
Murder (Related to GBV)	8	4	9	34	1	30
Threatening to Kill (Domestically)	10	24	46	123	36	99
TOTAL	**128**	**6655**	**383**	**6402**	**255**	**-253**

1.13 CYBERCRIMES

Cybercrimes pose significant risks to individuals, institutions and Government entities, manifesting through online fraud, phishing, system hacking, data breaches and identity theft. In addition, cybercriminals exploit cryptocurrency and dark web platforms for recruitment, fraud, ransomware payments and anonymous blockchain transactions, fuelling the rise in cybercrime while concealing virtual assets.

Notably, Artificial Intelligence (AI) is increasingly used to automate and scale up attacks.

The media has, on some occasions acted as a platform for misinformation and disinformation, generation of malicious content and propagation of hate speech, thereby impacting negatively on national security. Table 15 below presents the status of cyber-related cases for the reporting period.

Table 15: Statistics On Cyber Related Cases From 1st September 2025 to 30th August 2026:

S/NO	DESCRIP	PERIOD

		Sep-25	Oct-25	Nov-25	Dec-25	Jan-26	Feb-26	Mar-26	Apr-26	May-26	June-26	July2026	August 2026	Total
1.	No. of Offences	14	06	09	13	05	12	17	25	20	34	15	19	**189**
2.	No. Suspect Arrested and Prosecut	-	02	01	01	01	-	01	01	-	01	02	-	**10**

	e d													

Recognising the growing threat posed by cybercrime to national security, public institutions, businesses and individuals, the Government has implemented the following measures:

a. Strengthened cybercrime investigation and digital forensic capabilities through the specialised training of cyber forensic officers.

b. Enhanced digital forensic capacity through the acquisition of advanced cyber forensic tools, equipment and other specialised digital investigation technologies.

c. Continued specialised training in fraud and forgery investigations, banking operations, financial crime investigations and the investigation of digital and virtual asset-related fraud.

d. Created the National Cybersecurity Agency to coordinate the fight against cybercrime.

Despite these interventions, the following challenges persist:

a. The increasing sophistication and complexity of cyber threats.

b. The growing misuse of cryptocurrency and virtual assets to facilitate fraud, ransomware payments, money laundering and anonymous financial transactions, making investigations and asset tracing more complex.

c. The emergence of Artificial Intelligence (AI)-enabled cyber operations which has scaled automation and malicious activities by cybercriminals.

d. Inability to control or regulate cyber systems that are hosted outside the country.

e. High turnover of cybersecurity experts in the Government.

To strengthen the national response to cybercrime, the Government commits to:

a. Enhance cyber forensic and digital investigation capabilities through continuous investment in advanced technologies, specialised equipment and modern forensic laboratories.

b. Expand specialised training programmes for investigators, prosecutors and other criminal justice practitioners to strengthen the investigation and prosecution of cybercrime and digital financial offences.

c. Strengthen the legal and policy framework to address emerging cyber threats.

d. Enhance collaboration among law enforcement agencies, financial institutions, telecommunications providers, regulatory bodies, international partners and social media platform owners to improve cyber threat intelligence, information sharing and coordinated response.

e. Strengthen public awareness and cyber hygiene programmes to promote safe online practices and enhance resilience.

1.13 ILLICIT SMALL ARMS AND LIGHT WEAPONS

Kenya has had periodic security challenges in some parts of the country, largely as a result of the proliferation of Illicit Small Arms and Light Weapons (SALWs). Both internal and external factors contribute to the firearms-related challenges facing the country. SALWs pose a significant threat to national security, socio-economic progress and regional stability. As a regional hub, Kenya faces challenges from cross-border arms trafficking linked to conflicts in the Great Lakes region, the Horn of Africa and the wider East African region.

Criminal gangs have continued to acquire homemade guns and source illicit arms from local gun-runners, which they use to perpetrate crime, especially in urban areas. The vice remains rampant in border areas within the North Rift, North Eastern and major urban

centres, with pistols and AK-47 rifles being the most trafficked illicit arms. Table 16 below shows illicit SALWs recovered during the period under review.

Table 16:Comparative Statistics on Illicit Small Arms and Light Weapons Recovered from September 2025 to August 2026

Category	**Sept 2024 - August 2025**	**Sept 2025 - August 2026**	**Difference**
Firearms	87	3483	3396
Explosives	8	55	47
Ammunition	1059	11964	10905
Magazines	30	2594	2564

Note: The notable increase in the recovery of firearms was occasioned by the intensified disarmament security operation (Operation *Maliza Uhalifu*).

The following measures have been taken to address this menace:

a. Continued disarmament operations focused on the recovery of illicit firearms and ammunition.

b. Sustained destruction of illegal and state-owned obsolete firearms.

c. Enhanced intelligence-led operations in regions with a high concentration of illicit SALWs to identify and dismantle arms-trafficking networks.

d. Branding of 98% and 92% of Government security agencies' and KDF firearms respectively in Mandera, Wajir, Nakuru and Mombasa Counties.

e. Conducted control and accountability for state-owned SALWs, ammunition and records audit in Laikipia, Machakos, Embu, Meru, Murang' a and Nyeri Counties.

f. Strengthened border controls to prevent the proliferation of arms across porous borders.

g. Continuous arrests and prosecution of persons found in possession of illicit arms and those abetting the illegal acquisition of arms by communities.

h. Conducted capacity building on Weapons and Ammunition Management (WAM) through training of 1,000 law enforcement officers on accountability.

i. Storage, handling, record keeping, inventory management and effective tracing of state owned SALWs.

Despite the countermeasures the following gaps persist: porous borders; regional instability facilitating easy access to illegal firearms; and, existence of arms-trafficking networks in the region.

Going forward, the Government is committed to:

a. Enhancing community policing initiatives.

b. Increasing public sensitisation campaigns.

c. Continuing joint, targeted disarmament programmes in affected areas.

d. Enforcing stricter penalties for those involved in the illegal trade and possession of firearms and explosives.

e. Investing in modern arms-tracing technology to track and seize illicit firearms more effectively.

f. Supporting strategies to stabilise the Horn of Africa to curtail the availability of illegal firearms and ammunition.

g. Strengthening inter-state collaboration to address cross-border arms trafficking.

1.14 BANDITRY AND CATTLE RUSTLING

Banditry and cattle rustling persist in various parts of the country, mainly in the North Rift, Upper Eastern and parts of Northern Kenya. These criminal activities are often rooted in historical conflicts and exacerbated by commercialisation of cattle theft and climate-induced migration in Arid and Semi-Arid Lands (ASALs).

Over time, cattle rustling has evolved into organised crime characterised by the proliferation of illicit firearms, cross-border networks, violent revenge attacks and inter-communal tension in the affected regions. The vice has led to loss of life, displacement of communities, destruction of property and disruption of social and economic activities.

The period under review saw a notable increase in the number of raids from **673** in September 2024 to August 2025 to **913** in September 2025 to August 2026. The number of livestock stolen rose from 20,308 in 2024/2025 to 22,885 in a similar period in 2025/2026 translating to a 13% rise. Additionally, there was also a 34 per cent rise in the number of livestock recovered from 11,704 in 2024/2025 to 15,697 during the review period. This is summarised in Figure 3 below.




Figure 3:Comparative Statistics on raids , livestock stolen and recovered

Further, a total of 94 persons were killed, whereas 108 others sustained injuries as a result of the banditry attacks in the current reporting period, compared to 93 persons killed and 71 persons injured in the previous reporting period, respectively. Police officers arrested a total of 354 suspects, representing a 23% increase in the number of suspects arrested compared to a similar period in 2024/2025. This is presented in Table 17.

Table 17:Comparative statistics on Persons Killed/Injured and Suspects arrested during the period from September 2025 to August 2026

PERSONS	SEP 2024- AUG 2025	SEP 2025- AUG 2026	VAR	%CHANGE
Persons Killed	93	94	1	1
Persons Injured	71	108	37	52
Suspects Arrested	288	354	66	23

Recognising the threat posed by banditry and cattle rustling to national security, livelihoods and socio-economic development, the Government has implemented the following measures:

a. Enhanced the operational capacity and mobility of security agencies.

b. Conducted sustained intelligence-led security operations to recover stolen livestock, apprehend perpetrators and dismantle organised banditry and cattle-rustling networks.

c. Established strategic security deployments and rapid response capabilities in banditry and cattle-rustling hotspots.

d. Conducted targeted disarmament operations in banditry-prone areas that led to the recovery of 2,394 illegally held firearms.

e. Opened up security roads and provided alternative sources of livelihoods through allocation of equalisation funds within the affected areas.

f. Rehabilitated schools in banditry-affected areas which facilitated the resumption of learning.

g. Strengthened community policing and partnerships with local communities and other stakeholders to enhance information sharing, early warning and collaborative approaches to preventing banditry and cattle rustling.

h. Promoted peacebuilding, dialogue and conflict resolution initiatives to address disputes over grazing resources and administrative boundaries that often trigger livestock-related conflicts.

i. Conducted public awareness programmes to educate livestock owners on preventive security measures, including secure livestock enclosures, livestock identification and traceability and the timely reporting of suspicious activities.

Despite the measures undertaken, the following gaps persist in combating banditry and cattle rustling:

a. Porous borders that facilitate the cross-border movement and disposal of stolen livestock, thereby complicating enforcement and recovery efforts.

b. The continued proliferation of illegal firearms, which has increased the organisation, sophistication and lethality of banditry and cattle-rustling activities.

c. Limited information sharing by communities with security agencies due to mistrust and fear of reprisals, which undermines intelligence-led operations.

d. Challenging terrain which hampers recovery efforts of stolen livestock.

e. Climate change and increasing competition over grazing resources continue to exacerbate inter-community conflicts and livestock-related violence.

f. Commercialisation of cattle rustling.

g. The high levels of illiteracy in the cattle rustling prone areas.

To strengthen the fight against banditry and cattle rustling and promote lasting peace and security in affected regions, the Government commits to:

a. Enhancing the operational capacity of security agencies through the acquisition of specialised equipment, mobility assets, surveillance technologies and communication systems suited to the challenging terrain in banditry-prone areas.

b. Continuous opening up of security roads to improve mobility and service delivery within the affected areas.

c. Strengthening bilateral and regional cooperation with neighbouring countries to dismantle transnational cattle-rustling and illicit arms networks.

d. Strengthening livestock identification, traceability and movement control systems, while enhancing surveillance of livestock markets to curb the sale and cross-border movement of stolen livestock.

e. Promoting climate-smart livestock production, sustainable natural resource management and affordable livestock insurance schemes to enhance the resilience of pastoral communities to climate-related shocks.

f. Strengthening mechanisms for resolving inter-community disputes over grazing resources and administrative boundaries through alternative dispute resolution frameworks.

g. Enhancing community policing, early warning systems and partnerships with local communities to strengthen intelligence gathering, improve public trust and support timely security interventions.

1.15 INTER-COMMUNAL CONFLICTS

Inter-communal hostilities continued to instigate insecurity in parts of Rift Valley, Eastern, North Eastern and Coast regions despite sustained security operations. During the review period, inter-communal hostilities were fuelled by climatic shocks and attendant competition for access to grazing resources, livestock theft, unrelenting banditry attacks, protracted land and boundary disputes, and conflicts over control of mineral resources. Further, tacit involvement of local leaders and heightened acquisition of illegal firearms by rival communities increased proclivity for revenge attacks and severity of hostilities. Notably, during the reporting period, thirty (30) lives were lost, communities displaced and socio-economic activities disrupted in the affected areas as shown in Table 18 presents the number of Ethnic Conflict incidences reported during the review period.

Table 18:Summary of numbers of Regional Ethnic Conflict Incidences during the reporting period.

Region	No. of Incidents	Victims

		Killed	Injured
Coast	4	18	11
Eastern	5	10	2
Rift Valley	7	2	2
Total	**16**	**30**	**15**

At the same time, local elites continued to exploit the persisting conflicts to mobilise ethnic support, framing insecurity as a consequence of government neglect or inciting resistance to ongoing security interventions. Separately, cross-border animosities among the Turkana, Daasanach, Nyangatom and the Toposa, over cyclic livestock thefts and competition for grazing and fishing resources, continued to undermine security along Kenya' s border with Ethiopia and South Sudan.

The Government has therefore implemented the following measures to combat the menace:

a. Sustained peace-building initiatives within the affected regions in collaboration with non-state actors.
b. Enhanced Alternative Dispute Resolution (ADR) initiatives amongst affected communities.
c. Establishment and operationalisation of new administrative units in the affected areas to enhance government' s presence and service delivery.
d. Conducted security operations in the affected areas to restore normalcy.
e. Instituted early warning mechanisms to identify rising tensions.

Despite the ongoing security interventions, inter-communal conflicts are likely to persist due to the following challenges:

a. Continued proliferation of illicit weapons.
b. Incitement by leaders from feuding communities, which is affecting community buy-in of Government peace and security interventions.
c. Heightened competition for control of grazing and mineral resources in parts of the country.
d. Protracted land and boundary disputes.
e. Operational, infrastructural, and logistical challenges in ongoing security operations.

Going forward the Government commits to:

a. Sustain intelligence-led security operations within the hotspot areas.
b. Sustain continuous adjudication and titling of land as well as digitization of land registries.
c. Address resource constraints facing security sector and enhance inter-agency coordination.
d. Enhance integrated technology-driven border management strategies to minimize the flow of illicit small arms and light weapons from neighbouring countries.
e. Resolve protracted land and boundary disputes and improve resource governance to promote equitable access to resources among communities.
f. Expedite operationalisation of gazetted administrative units within the disturbed areas.

1.16 ENVIRONMENT AND CLIMATE CHANGE

In the period under review, the country continued to experience erratic weather patterns linked to climate change, which affected food production in parts of the country. Notably, the early onset of elevated long rains which peaked in April 2026, resulted in flooding, rising levels of waterbodies, landslides and mudslides, with attendant destruction of infrastructure, 110 fatalities and over 7,000 displaced households across 30 counties. The situation was compounded by early cessation of the rains in Mid-May 2026, which has affected crop development. Meanwhile, the likely enhancement of the October-December, 2026 rains, attributed to the anticipated El-Nino phenomenon, may heighten the risk of flooding, food insecurity, disease outbreaks and damage to infrastructure.

To mitigate against the adverse effects of climate change, the Government is pursuing the 15 billion tree cover target by 2032. The cumulative number of trees planted to date stands at 1,884,569,294. During the reporting period, a total of 1,014,886,093 trees were grown, comprising of 514,886,093 planted trees and 500,000,000 trees established through natural regeneration. Compared to last reporting period where 517,784,487 trees were planted across various regions and institutions in Kenya. Table 19 shows a Comparative analysis of tree growing over the two year period.

Table 19:Comparative analysis of tree growing for the last two years

MONTH	2024/25	2025/2026	VARIANCE
September	75,990,076	34,106,251	-41,883,825
October	178,902,734	51,982,592	-126,920,142
November	52,644,398	41,647,683	- 10,996,715
December	34,143,174	40,418,181	+6,275,007
January	5,063,855	59,661,573	+54,597,718
February	55,615,046	58,223,554	+2,608,508
March	46,418,662	154,326,237	+107,907,575

April	18,442,706	125,289,265	+106,846,559
May	15,710,261	250,557,681	+234,847,420
June	12,466,734	105,075,724	+92,608,990
July	7,109,432	35,474,945	+28,365,513
August	15,277,409	58,122,407	+42,844,998
TOTAL	**517,784,487**	**1,014,886,093**	

The Government rolled out strategic multi-agency coordination to respond to disaster risks, encompassing;

a. Enactment of the National Disaster Risk Management Act, 2026.
b. Establishment of an ad-hoc Cabinet committee on El-Nino preparedness and response.
c. Mapping of disaster-prone areas and deployment of humanitarian relief interventions.
d. Cleaning of Nairobi River and its tributaries.
e. Public awareness on the upcoming El-Nino.
f. Unclogging the drainages in urban areas.
g. Rehabilitation of road networks.
h. Relocation and resettlement of affected populations.
i. Launching of the Disaster Risk Financing Strategy 2026-2030, which shifts the country to proactive financial preparedness for climate change and multi-hazard shocks.

Despite the foregoing government interventions, the following challenges persist:

a. Limited resources in comparison to the scale of the disasters.
b. Insufficient public awareness on environmental disaster risks.

c. Deforestation and wanton logging.
d. Arson in protected lands.
e. Rapid urbanisation putting pressure on the existing resources and infrastructure.

Going forward the Government will:

a. Implement the National Disaster Risk Management Act 2026.
b. Strengthen disaster response mechanisms, including last mile early warning communication.
c. Fast-track completion of dams to harvest water during floods.

1.17 WILDLIFE SECURITY

Wildlife security threats remained a concern as vices such as poaching, illegal trade in wildlife, game meat and human-wildlife conflict persisted. During the reporting period, successful disruptions and recoveries were recorded in high-risk areas and key ports of entry and exit, targeting wildlife trafficking networks and illegal trade in wildlife and forestry products. A total of 745 suspects were arrested in wildlife crime operations resulting in the recovery of 7,747.95 kg of sandalwood, 716.45 kg of elephant trophies, 0.1 kgs of rhino horn, 10,526.38 kgs of illegally obtained fish, and 15,936.21 kgs of bush meat.

Table 20 below indicates the comparative statistics for wildlife recoveries and arrests made during the two review periods.

Table 20:Comparative analysis of wildlife recoveries and arrests

Wildlife Recoveries	**2024/2025**	**2025/2026**
Elephant Trophies/ivory	6,214	716.45 Kgs
Sandalwood	0	7,747.95 Kgs
Rhino horn	96	0.1 Kgs

Wildlife Recoveries	2024/2025	2025/2026
Illegally obtained Fish	0	10,526.38 Kgs
Bushmeat	13,837	15,936.21 Kgs
Number of Arrests	1,798	745

Commercial bushmeat poaching is resurging in the Central Rift (notably in Naivasha, Gilgil, and Soysambu), with supply chains linked to Nairobi markets, particularly Dagoreti Abattoir, targeting buffalo and zebra species. In Northern Kenya (Garissa, Wajir, Marsabit, and Mandera), bushmeat poaching is increasingly associated with armed groups and cross-border insecurity, threatening species such as the reticulated giraffe and hirola.

Additional observed trends include: increased use of firearms in poaching, expansion of cross-border trafficking networks, sophisticated concealment of wildlife products, growing involvement of local facilitators, exploitation of human-wildlife conflict situations, and increased use of motorcycles for rapid movement of illegal wildlife products.

The Government undertook the following measures to counter wildlife crime and enhance anti-poaching operations:

a. Continuous training of relevant multi-agency teams on handling of wildlife crimes.

b. Intensified intelligence-led anti-poaching and multi-agency operations in identified poaching hotspots, trafficking corridors, and protected areas to dismantle wildlife trafficking syndicates.

c. Strengthened surveillance and inspections at border points, airports, courier services, curio shops, transport corridors, markets and key transit routes to detect and intercept trafficked wildlife and marine species.

d. Continued community engagement and public awareness initiatives to support wildlife conservation and reporting of wildlife crimes.

e. Enhanced prosecution support and collaboration with criminal justice actors to improve handling and prosecution of wildlife crime cases.

f. Adopted innovations and technologies in wildlife crime prevention and investigation, including operationalisation of the Kenya Wildlife Service Digital Forensics Laboratory for digital evidence extraction.

g. Implemented community-led deterrent initiatives and alternative livelihood programmes to reduce drivers of human-wildlife conflict.

h. Processed 5,703 compensation claims due to human-wildlife conflicts for the financial year 2025/2026.

1.18 ILLEGAL UNREPORTED AND UNREGULATED (IUU) FISHING

Kenya's Blue Economy sector is highly dependent on a secure marine and freshwater environment. Maritime safety and security are foundational to Kenya's Blue Economy, underpinning the protection of its maritime domain, the safety of navigation, and the integrity of international trade routes that pass through the Western Indian Ocean and inland waters especially Lake Victoria.

IUU fishing poses a significant maritime security threat by undermining sustainable management of maritime resources leading to loss of Government revenue and depriving communities of their livelihood. Tackling IUU fishing directly supports African

Union Agenda 2063 on sustainable Blue Economy aimed at protecting Government revenue, jobs and sustainable fish stocks.

The Government has implemented the following measures:

a. Multi-Agency collaboration to secure territorial waters against illegal fishing.
b. Regional and International cooperation to tackle IUU fishing.
c. Enhancing community participation by empowering Beach Management Units (BMUs) and communities to partner with State security agencies in monitoring marine resources.

Despite the measures undertaken by the Government continues the following challenges persist:

a. Inadequate surveillance infrastructure.
b. Coordination gaps arising from overlapping mandates among agencies responsible for maritime safety, security, fisheries, and environmental management.
c. Legal and Policy Gaps: Key binding obligations including the Biodiversity Beyond National Jurisdiction (BBNJ) Agreement, Lomé Charter, and International Maritime Organisation (IMO) Conventions, are yet to be transposed into domestic law.

Going forward, the Government commits to combat IUU fishing by:

a. Undertaking a comprehensive legislative audit to map international maritime and ocean governance obligations, measuring them against Kenya's existing legal framework to ensure full compliance.
b. Enhance institutional capacity by addressing gaps in information security and engagement protocols.

c. Enhance Community Engagement by sensitising local communities on reporting IUU fishing.
d. Strengthen Regional and International Cooperation on combating IUU fishing.

1.19 IDENTIFICATION DOCUMENTS FRAUD


The fraudulent acquisition of Kenyan identification documents persisted during the review period, with attendant adverse implications on national security. The vice was perpetrated by syndicates comprising human smugglers, travel agencies and brokers in collusion with some Government officials. Notably, acquisition of documents remained a significant enabler of organised crime, particularly human trafficking, illegal immigration and terrorism financing.

During the review period, forged documents were used to facilitate undocumented transit of aliens through Kenya, fraudulent visa applications, and the establishment of false identities for trafficking victims and criminal operatives. Illegally acquired documents also allowed aliens to access SIM card registration, mobile money platforms, and bank accounts within the country, thus creating avenues for money laundering, fraud and other financial crimes.

Notwithstanding the digitisation of immigration systems and the National Registration Bureau, forged documents continued to circulate widely due to corruption and the persistence of unverified legacy data within digital registries. The vice is prevalent in Nairobi, Busia, Tana River, Trans Nzoia, Garissa, West Pokot, Mandera and Mombasa counties.

During the period under review, document fraud increased, with passport fraud rising by sixty-five (65) cases, while national identification card fraud increased by forty (40).

Notably, there were no cases of other documents during the reporting period. Fig 4 below presents a comparative analysis of the number of identification documents fraud cases reported during the two periods.



	PASSPORT	ID CARD	OTHER DOCUMENTS
Sep'2025- August 2026	76	76	0
Sep'24-Aug'25	11	36	1

Figure 4:Comparative Number of cases of identification documents fraud

Government interventions included:

a. Sustained multi-agency security operations targeting document fraud networks leading to arrests and prosecutions.

b. Strengthened travellers screening, profiling, immigration checks, and continuous officers' training.

c. Use of e-TA and Advance Passenger Information (API) which has strengthened pre-arrival screening at Ports of Entry (PoE).

d. Conducted targeted interviews to identify trafficking indicators thus denying travel clearance for potential victims.

e. Operationalised the Illegal and Irregular Registration Review Committee to detect, investigate, and determine cases involving suspected illegal registrations.

f. Continued implementing the Live Capture System to automate biometric enrolment.

Some of the challenges constraining efforts to address document fraud include:

a. Inadequacies in border management, including complicity of some law enforcement personnel in the crime.

b. Rogue employment agencies abetting human trafficking.

c. Inadequate document examination experts.

d. Lenient penalties imposed on human smugglers/traffickers and illegal immigrants intercepted in the country.

e. Jurisdictional complexity, particularly in curbing transnational criminal networks involving foreign nationals that require cross-border legal cooperation, extradition frameworks, and intelligence sharing.

Going forward the Government commits to:

a. Fast-track full integration of Civil Registration and vital data system with relevant institutions for real-time verification.

b. Enforce 100% hospital linkage to civil registration system to ensure all births and deaths are captured immediately they occur.

c. Encourage reporting of home-based births and deaths.

d. Enhance targeted multi-agency security operations against document fraudsters in the country.

e. Enhance the number of qualified document examiners.

f. Sustain the crackdown on corruption and take stern disciplinary action against Government officials abetting document fraud.
g. Reinforce regional and international cooperation to disrupt cross-border document facilitation network.
h. Strengthen oversight of recruitment and travel agencies, including enforcement of mandatory licensing and criminal liability for unlawful recruitment.
i. Tighten vulnerabilities being exploited by organized crime networks to fraudulently acquire documents.
j. Sustain digitisation of Government services and records.
k. Review relevant legislations to enhance penalties for document fraud offences.

1.20 ILLEGAL ALIENS AND UNDOCUMENTED IMMIGRANTS

Kenya continues to experience a significant influx of undocumented immigrants and irregular migrants fleeing conflict, political instability and economic hardship in the region among others. The movement of undocumented individuals across Points of Entry (POEs) directly undermines Kenya's national security.

The reporting period recorded a total of 1,048 aliens arrested, representing a 10% increase compared to a similar period in 2024/2025. Notably, majority of the illegal immigrants arrested were Ethiopian nationals, with 592 accounting for 56.5% of the total number of illegal aliens and undocumented immigrants arrested in the entire country. This was followed by Somalis, Eritreans and Burundians recording 156, 126 and 50 arrests respectively. Sudanese, Swedish and Canadians recorded the least number of nationalities arrested each recording one (1) arrest. Table 21 shows the Comparative number of illegal aliens and undocumented immigrants arrested during the two reporting periods.

Table 21:Nationality of Illegal Aliens and Undocumented Immigrants

Nationality	Sep. 2024 - Aug 2025	Sep. 2025 - Aug 2026	VAR	% Change
Ethiopians	670	592	-78	(11.6)
Somalis	90	156	66	73.3
Tanzanians	9	25	16	177.8
Rwandese	0	14	14	0
Burundians	69	50	-19	(27.5)
Congolese	7	5	-2	(28.6)
Nigerian	3	24	21	700.0
South Sudanese	0	9	9	0
Sudanese	2	12	10	500.0
Ugandans	18	26	8	44.4
Eritreans	74	126	52	70.3
Egyptians	11	1	-10	(90.9)
Others	0	8	8	0
TOTAL	**953**	**1048**	**95**	**10.0**

Recognising the security, socio-economic and humanitarian implications associated with illegal immigration and undocumented migration, the Government has undertaken the following measures:

a. Strengthened community engagement by empowering border communities and integrating local stakeholders into early warning and reporting mechanisms to combat human smuggling and trafficking networks.

b. Enhanced border security and surveillance through establishment of the Counter Organized Immigration Crimes Unit within NPS to augment other existing efforts.

c. Intensified enforcement measures through the identification, arrest, prosecution, repatriation and deportation of illegal immigrants in accordance with the law and applicable international obligations.

d. Strengthened collaboration with diplomatic missions to facilitate identity verification, consular support and the orderly repatriation of undocumented foreign nationals.

e. Enhanced cooperation with neighbouring countries and international partners through joint operations, intelligence sharing and coordinated efforts to combat transnational organised crime, human trafficking and migrant smuggling.

Despite these interventions, the Government continues to face the following challenges:

a. Border management deficiencies.
b. The increasing sophistication of transnational organised criminal networks involved in human trafficking, migrant smuggling and document fraud.
c. Limited public awareness and community cooperation.

Going forward, the Government commits to:

a. Enhance the deployment of modern border management technologies to improve border security and migration control.

b. Sustain multi-agency collaboration and operations targeting illegal and undocumented immigrants.

c. Review and strengthen the legal and policy framework governing immigration, asylum and border management to address emerging migration trends, transnational organised crime and document fraud.

d. Strengthen bilateral, regional and international cooperation to combat illegal immigration, migrant smuggling and human trafficking.

e. Strengthen institutional capacity and infrastructure for the timely processing of asylum applications and migration management.

f. Intensify public awareness and community engagement programmes to encourage the reporting of illegal immigration.

1.21 TRADE IN CONTRABAND AND COUNTERFEIT PRODUCTS

Trade in contraband and counterfeit goods continues to create an unfair environment for legitimate businesses, occasioning loss of government revenue besides posing safety risks to the public and promoting black-market activity and funding criminal enterprise.

During the review period, the Government noted increasing sale of illicit products in the Kenyan market. Some of the counterfeited products include; alcohol, medicine, cosmetics and electronics. Notably, there was a 77% decrease in contraband sugar seized. Conversely, 132,156 packs of cigarettes were netted, a significant increase from 9,707 packs in the previous period, indicating a shift in trafficking trends. Table 22 presents the comparative data on quantities of contraband goods netted during the two periods.

Table 22:Summary of comparative quantities of Seized Contraband Goods

CATEGORY	SEP 2024 -AUG 2025	SEP 2025-AUG 2026	VAR	%VAR
Sugar	52075	12145	-39930	(77)
Alcohol	24570	75948	51378	209
Fertilizers	521	478	-43	(8)
Cigarette	9707	132156	122449	1261
Counterfeit USD	0	2333	2333	100
Milk	3437	11400	7963	232
Ethanol	58908	37270	-21638	(37)
Polythene	0	94012	94012	100

Recognising the adverse effects of contraband and counterfeit trade on public health, consumer safety, Government revenue and economic development, the Government has implemented the following measures:

a. Strengthened border security through enhanced multi-agency collaboration.
b. Sustained enforcement of laws governing contraband and counterfeit goods.
c. Strengthened the capacity of customs and law enforcement agencies through specialised training.
d. Enhanced public awareness campaigns on the health risks associated with counterfeit goods.
e. Enhanced bilateral regional and international cooperation to combat cross-border contraband smuggling.
f. Promoted the adoption of product authentication technologies to enhance product traceability and verification.

g. Strengthened monitoring of e-commerce platforms to detect and remove listings of counterfeit and contraband products.
h. Confiscated and destroyed counterfeit and contraband goods in accordance with the law, to prevent their re-entry into the market.

Despite these interventions, the Government's efforts to curb the vice are undermined by:

a. Inconsistent enforcement of existing laws and regulations which allows contraband traders and counterfeiters to continue operating with limited deterrence.
b. The rapidly growing e-commerce and digital platforms which have created new avenues for the sale and distribution of counterfeit and contraband goods.
c. Limited public awareness and the affordability of counterfeit products continue to sustain consumer demand despite the associated health, safety and economic risks.
d. Collusion between some government officials and unscrupulous business persons.
e. Advances in counterfeiting techniques which complicates identification of counterfeit products.

Going forward, the Government commits to strengthen the fight against trade in contraband by:

a. Enhancing border management and oversight.
b. Arrests and prosecution of perpetrators facilitating the illicit trade.
c. Bolstering inter-agency coordination and crackdowns on contraband networks.
d. Enhancing public-private partnerships to improve reporting and disrupt illicit supply chains.

e. Enhancing technological capabilities for detection and verification of sophisticated counterfeit and contraband goods.

f. Strengthening regional and international cooperation.

1.22 ROAD TRAFFIC ACCIDENTS

The Government has transitioned from fragmented interventions to a structured, multi-sectoral road safety management model, focused on legislation, infrastructure, enforcement and community engagement to reduce road traffic accidents.

During the period under review, a total of 11,915 accident cases were reported, compared to 11,413 accidents during the same period in the previous reporting period. This marks a 4.4% increase in the number of accidents. In addition, the number of victims increased by 5.3%, from 24,434 in the earlier period to 25,737 in the reporting period highlighting the continuing threat posed by road traffic accidents, which remain a serious security concern. Table 23 illustrates the comparative number of Road Traffic Accidents per category reported during the two reporting periods.

Table 23:comparative number of Road Traffic Accidents per category

Road Traffic Accidents				
Categories of Accidents	**September 2024-Aug 2025**	**September 2025-Aug 2026**	**Variance**	**% Change**
Fatal RTAs	4,184	4,579	395	9.4
Serious Injury RTAs	5,792	5,926	134	2.3
Slight Injury RTAs	1,437	1,410	-27	-1.9
TOTAL	**11,413**	**11,915**	**502**	**4.4**

1.22.1 Categories of Accident Victims

The country recorded an increase in Road Traffic Accidents (RTA) victims from 24,434 in 2024/2025 to 23,541translating into a 3.7% drop. The number of fatalities rose from 4,794 to 5,269 translating into a 9.9% increase. In addition, serious injury victims increased from 11,513 in the previous reporting period, to 11,975 translating into a 4.0% rise. Further, slight injuries victims increased from 8,127 in the 12-month period in 2024/2025 to 8,493 representing a 4.5% rise. Table 24 shows the number of road traffic accident victims that occurred during the two comparative reporting periods.

Table 24: Comparative number of Road Traffic Accident Victims

Road Traffic Accident Victims				
Categories of Accidents	**September 2024-Aug 2025**	**September 2025-Aug 2026**	**Variance**	**% Change**
Fatalities	4,794	5,269	475	9.9
Serious Injuries	11,513	11,975	462	4.0
Light Injuries	8,127	8,493	366	4.5
TOTAL	**24,434**	**25,737**	**1303**	**5.3**

1.22.2 Fatalities as Per Road User Group

The reporting period depicts an increase in the number of fatalities as per road users' group among Pedestrians, drivers, passengers, pillion passengers, pedal cyclists and motor cyclists by 10.1%, 12.9%, 7.1%, 4.6%, 14.9% and 12.1% respectively.

Generally, the figures depict an upward trend in the number of fatalities during the reporting period translating to a 9.9% rise as illustrated in the Table 25 below.

Table 25:Comparison of Fatalities as Per Road User Group

Road User	September 2024-Aug 2025	September 2025-Aug 2026	Variance
Pedestrians	1,795	1,976	181
Drivers	426	481	55
Passenger	805	862	57
Pillion Passenger	458	479	21
Pedal Cyclist	74	85	11
Motor Cyclist	1,236	1,386	150
Total	**4,794**	**5,269**	**475**

On a monthly basis, the month of December recorded the highest number of fatalities in the two years recording 466 and 567 in 2024/25, 2025/26 respectively, probably due to the high traffic occasioned by the festive season. Additionally, the month of March recorded an increase of 86 fatalities from 387 in 2024/2025 to 473 representing a 22.2% rise. Table 26 below illustrates the monthly distribution of fatalities for the reporting period.

Table 26:Comparative Monthly distribution of fatalities for the reporting period.

Months	September 2024-Aug 2025	September 2025-Aug 2026	VAR
September	402	400	-2

Months	September 2024-Aug 2025	September 2025-Aug 2026	VAR
October	382	407	25
November	373	422	49
December	466	567	101
January	392	430	38
February	360	378	18
March	387	473	86
April	408	434	26
May	395	421	26
June	414	411	-3
July	396	445	49
August	419	481	62
Total	**4,794**	**5,269**	**475**

In response to rising concerns over road traffic accidents and safety violations, the Government has implemented a series of interventions aimed at reducing fatalities and enhancing road-user responsibility, including:

a. Utilisation of data-driven interventions, including blackspot mapping, installation of surveillance and speed cameras, and live tracking of public and commercial vehicles to enhance enforcement and risk monitoring.

b. Continuous national sensitisation activities including Public Service Vehicles (PSVs) drivers' clinics, speed-limit checks, pedestrian awareness campaigns, medical screening, footbridge cleaning across counties.

c. Continuous road maintenance, installation of road furniture, and provision of pedestrian walkways in urban centres and major towns.

d. Enhancement of traffic control and automation systems on major highways, to deter violations and promote compliance.

e. Sustained arrest and prosecution of traffic offenders.

f. Continous multi-agency road safety operations.

Despite these interventions, the Government continues to face the following challenges:

a. Rapid and underregulated growth of the *boda boda* sector, compounded by fragmented oversight, limited licensing and enforcement gaps.

b. Increasing incidents of reckless and drunk driving posing risks to both motorists and pedestrians.

c. Vandalism of road furniture (signage and road markings) in certain areas, contributing to frequent accidents and reduced navigability.

d. Absence of a comprehensive national transport master plan, limiting strategic planning, investment coordination and long-term infrastructure development.

To address the aforementioned challenges the Government remains committed to:

a. Digitising crash data collection and analysis to support evidence-based policymaking, risk identification and performance monitoring in road safety management.

b. Digitising motor vehicle registration and driver licensing systems to enable administrative enforcement of traffic penalties during licence renewals and vehicle inspections.

c. Enhancing emergency response mechanisms, including coordinated strategies to ensure timely medical and logistical assistance to accident victims.

d. Fast-tracking the enactment and integration of legislation focused on enforcing road safety standards, including speed limits, alcohol testing and penalties for dangerous driving.

e. Investing in road infrastructure upgrades and expansion, particularly in high-risk areas, to enhance safety and improve traffic flow.

f. Scaling up public awareness campaigns with a focus on long-term behavioural change.

g. Establishing County Transport and Safety Committees, in collaboration with county governments, to localise road safety planning, regulate the *boda boda* sector, improve infrastructure and support grassroots campaigns such as *Usalama Barabarani*.

1.23 BODA BODA SECTOR-RELATED SECURITY THREATS

The *boda boda* sector has emerged as one of the most dynamic components of Kenya's informal economy, with a significant number of riders now embracing both traditional and hybrid customer-engagement models. Over the past two decades, the sector has experienced exponential growth, driven by high youth unemployment, rapid urbanisation and rising demand for last-mile connectivity. As of this year, over two million riders are actively engaged in the sector, providing direct employment to more than two million people and indirectly supporting millions more. The *boda boda* sector contributes significantly to Kenya's economy through job creation, revenue generation and the facilitation of trade.

Despite remarkable contribution to the country' s economy, the *boda boda* sector is associated with rising crimes such as general stealing, causing disturbance, road traffic accidents, theft, assault, trafficking and rape, all which have grave implications on public safety and security.

The Government, in collaboration with private and civil society actors, has initiated several interventions:

a. Enhancement of road safety campaigns and round-table stakeholder engagements at the national and county levels.

b. Encouraged registration of boda boda operators in structured SACCOs to organise riders and improve self-regulation.

c. Deployment of community policing strategies to reduce crime involving motorcycles.

d. Encouraged *boda boda* operators to transition into digital app-based platforms to enhanced accountability and regulation.

Despite the measures undertaken, the Government continues to face the following challenges in the *boda boda* sector:

a. Low compliance with traffic laws and road safety regulations by a section of riders, partly attributed to inadequate safety and skills training, contributing to unsafe road use.

b. High incidence of road traffic accidents largely attributed to reckless riding, inadequate rider training and non-adherence to safety standards.

c. Vulnerability of some riders to engage in crime.

d. Traffic congestion and disorder in urban centres arising from inadequate planning and traffic management infrastructure.

e. Inadequate coverage of riders under health insurance occupational safety and social protection programmes leaving many vulnerable to financial hardship following accidents or loss of income.

To address the *boda boda*-related security threats the Government commits to:

a. Strengthen the enforcement of mandatory rider training, testing, certification and licensing to enhance compliance with traffic laws and improve road safety.

b. Institutionalise regular road safety stakeholder forums to review progress, address emerging challenges and strengthen coordination among national and County Governments, law enforcement agencies and industry stakeholders.

c. Collaborate with county governments to develop and improve *boda boda* infrastructure, including designated stages, parking bays, sheds, and where feasible, dedicated motorcycle lanes to enhance safety and reduce congestion.

d. Promote the registration of all *boda boda* riders through recognised local leadership and sector associations to enhance accountability, facilitate identification and deter criminal elements from infiltrating the sector.

e. Strengthen collaboration between the National Police Service, County Governments, and *boda boda* leadership structures, to enhance intelligence sharing and self-regulation within the sector.

f. Create enabling environment to expand boda boda riders' access to affordable financing.

g. Enhance public awareness on road safety and responsible riding practices through sustained education and behavioural change campaigns targeting riders, passengers and other road users.

1.24 GAMING AND GAMBLING

Gaming and gambling in Kenya have continued to pose security threats, including reduced workforce productivity, truancy and drop-outs in institutions of learning, increased incidences of suicide, financial ruin and crimes related to money laundering, among others. In particular, illegal gaming and gambling are fuelled by unregulated online platforms, aggressive marketing and low betting thresholds, as well as predatory physical slot machines that are prevalent across the country.

Illegal offshore and foreign gambling websites access local markets without licenses which deny the Government revenue, regulatory powers, and expose the locals to fraud. Ownership of gaming entities by foreigners increases risks of capital flight and money laundering. Illegal gambling locations and environments are an enabler for other criminal activities.

In an effort to combat the social ills and insecurity associated with irresponsible gaming and gambling, the Government has taken the following measures:

a. Imposed strict licensing requirements, particularly for foreign operators, who must maintain a physical presence in Kenya, register locally and post a specific bond to legally operate in the country.

b. Enacted the Gaming Control Act 2025, under which the Gaming Regulatory Authority was established and a robust legal framework, for the effective regulation, licensing and oversight of the gaming and gambling sector.

c. Integrated licensed companies operating online gaming activities into Real-Time Tax Remittance Systems through a multi-sectoral approach.

d. Conducted multi-agency crackdowns to regularly shut down unlicensed physical betting shops and confiscate illegal machines.

e. Established a Multi-Agency Rapid Response Team to address the crisis, together with a helpline for reporting cases of irresponsible gambling or addiction.

f. Imposed heavy penalties on persons violating betting regulations.

g. Enhanced whole-of-society collaboration on gaming and gambling matters affecting national security within the applicable regulatory framework.

h. Enhanced collaboration between Government agencies and other stakeholders on gambling matters affecting National Security.

i. Put in place mechanisms for all Gaming operators to comply with the requirements of the Proceeds of Crime and Anti-Money Laundering Act, 2009.

j. Identified and blocked the unlicensed local and foreign gambling websites.

k. Regulated mass media advertisements on gaming and gambling.

Despite the measures undertaken, the following challenges continue to constrain efforts to regulate the gaming and gambling sector:

a. The affordability and increasing integration of telecommunications and digital payment platforms has enabled round-the-clock access to gaming and gambling services, making real-time monitoring and enforcement more complex.

b. Socio-economic pressures, including unemployment and limited income-generating opportunities leading to the negative perception that gambling is a source of livelihood instead of leisure/entertainment.

c. The proliferation of illegal gambling machines continues to exploit vulnerable groups and other economically active persons, exposing them to addictive gambling behaviours and associated social harms.

d. Unregulated offshore betting platforms, continue to undermine effective oversight and enforcement of the gaming and gambling sector.

To promote responsible gaming and gambling while safeguarding the public from the associated social and economic harms, the Government commits to:

a. Sustain enforcement of gaming and gambling regulations through enhanced inspections, intelligence-led operations and coordinated action against illegal operators, perpetrators and enablers of unlicensed gambling activities.

b. Enhance public awareness programmes on the risks associated with irresponsible gaming and gambling.

c. Enhancing collaboration with other regional and international gaming and gambling regulators.

d. Sustain collaboration between government agencies and stakeholders to improve compliance, monitoring and enforcement within the gaming and gambling sector.

1.25 UNREST IN INSTITUTIONS OF LEARNING

Insecurity in institutions of learning poses a serious threat to the education system and training programmes, often leading to disruption of learning, destruction of school property and loss of life. It is evident that most student unrest is premeditated and planned to cause maximum destruction.

Criminal activities such as murder, malicious damage to property, theft, and arson among others were reported in connection with student unrest in various secondary schools and other learning institutions across the country. The most prevalent offence during the reporting period was arson, whereby facilities such as dormitories, libraries, administration blocks, stores and classrooms were razed.

The period under review reported 488 schools affected by unrest, fire and arsons compared with 359 schools affected in a similar period of September 2024 to August 2025. This shows an increase of 129 cases countrywide.

Out of the 488 cases reported, general student unrests were 250, fire incidents were 185 and Arson 53. As a result of the incidences, 17 students succumbed whereas 171 (145 students and 26 non-students) were injured. A total of 557 persons were arrested (547 students and 10 non-students). Resultantly, 61 students and one (1) non-student were prosecuted for various offences. Tables 27, 28 and 29 presents a comparative analysis of schools unrest, victims of the unrest, and arrests and prosecutions respectively.

Table 27:Comparative school unrest figures for Sept - August 2025/2026

COMPARATIVE SCHOOL UNREST FIGURES FOR SEPT - AUG 2025/2026				
INCIDENT	**SEP 2024-AUG 2025**	**SEP 2025-AUG 2026**	**VAR**	**%VAR**
School Unrest	232	250	18	8
School Fire	109	185	76	70
School Arson	18	53	35	194
TOTAL	**359**	**488**	**129**	**36**

Table 28:Regional comparative analysis of victims arising from insecurity in learning Institutions Sept - August 2025/2026

REGION	FATALITIES		INJURED PERSONS	
	STUDENTS	NON-STUDENTS	STUDENTS	NON-STUDENTS
Eastern	0	0	7	10
Central	0	0	20	13
R. Valley	17	0	87	6
Western	0	0	7	0
Nyanza	1	0	24	3
TOTAL	**18**	**0**	**145**	**32**

Table 29:Regional comparative analysis of arrests and prosecutions for the period between Sept – August 2025/2026

REGION	ARRESTED		PROSECUTED	
	STUDENTS	NON-STUDENTS	STUDENTS	NON-STUDENTS
Coast	27	0	0	0
N/ Eastern	0	0	0	0
Eastern	86	0	2	0
Central	110	0	0	0
R. Valley	137	4	8	0
Western	15	0	0	0
Nyanza	168	6	59	1

Nairobi	**4**	**0**	**0**	**0**
TOTAL	**547**	**10**	**69**	**1**

The unrest was attributed to some factors, including leadership challenges in schools, examination-related anxiety, poor boarding conditions, alcohol and drug abuse, strenuous school routines, peer influence and demands by some learners for the early closure of schools.

To address the threat, the Government has continued to adopt strategic interventions, including:

a. Formation of a multi-stakeholder team to investigate the causes of the disturbances and recommend lasting solutions.
b. Targeted safety and risk audits of institutions to ensure compliance with set safety guidelines.
c. Arresting and prosecuting offenders.
d. Establishment of *Jukwaa la Wasomi* forums to share information, identify challenges and work on solutions that can prevent crime, resolve conflicts and promote safety.

However, the following factors hindered the government's efforts in combating the vice:

a. Limited structured engagement between school management and students.
b. Inadequate mentorship programmes for students leading to increased delinquency.
c. Non-compliance by some school management with the Safety Standards Manual for Schools.
d. Social media and societal influences encouraging rowdy behavior.

e. Peer pressure leading to aping behaviour.

f. Proliferation of drugs and illegal substances in learning institutions.

To ensure safety and security in learning institutions, the Government commits to:

a. Institute administrative and legal action against school management.

b. Combating drug and substance abuse in learning institutions.

c. Encouraging positive parenting through structured engagement between the stakeholders.

d. Ensuring compliance to the Safety Standards Manual for Schools.

1.26 VANDALISM

As the country continues to expand its infrastructure under the Bottom-Up Economic Transformation Agenda, corresponding security risks, including vandalism, are expected to increase in complexity and sophistication. The deliberate destruction, damage, or defacement of public and private property has become rampant in the country, especially during public demonstrations. It involves damaging buildings, roads, vehicles, electricity infrastructure, telecommunications equipment, or other public and private facilities. Regrettably, organised criminal groups have been targeting infrastructure, not only to cause damage but also to steal valuable materials.

Resultantly, Government agencies and private organisations spend significant amounts repairing or replacing damaged property. Vandalism causes power interruptions, financial losses, undermines investor confidence, disrupts essential services, threatens public safety and security, and slows economic development.

The Government has taken the following measures to address the menace:

a. Initiated structured stakeholder engagement to reduce conflicts associated with infrastructure projects.
b. Repaired vandalised infrastructure to reduce further damage and restore essential services.
c. Enhanced investigation and prosecution of offenders engaging in vandalism.
d. Enhanced surveillance through deployment of law enforcement officers to secure critical infrastructure.
e. Sensitised the members of the public on economic and security consequences of vandalism.
f. Strengthened early warning, reporting and response through community policing initiatives.
g. Sustained intelligence-led security operations to counter vandalism.
h. Enhanced enforcement of scrap metal regulations across the country.
i. Routine security threat and vulnerability assessments on critical infrastructure.
j. Joint intelligence sharing among partner security agencies.

Despite notable progress, several challenges continue to affect the effective fight against vandalism:

a. Increasing sophistication of cyber threats.
b. Limited public participation and sensitisation on infrastructure projects.
c. Unemployment contributing to vandalism and theft.

To strengthen national resilience and enhance protection of vital infrastructure, the government commits to:

a. Enhance security personnel deployment to protect infrastructure and fight vandalism.

b. Strengthen multi-stakeholder collaboration.

c. Upgrade security infrastructure including perimeter protection, access control systems and surveillance technology.

d. Capacity building and specialised training for personnel handling critical infrastructure protection.

1.27 THREATS TO AVIATION SECURITY

Kenya maintains a robust aviation security regime, anchored on national legislation and regulations, as well as compliance with international aviation standards, oversighted by the Kenya Civil Aviation Authority (KCAA) and the International Civil Aviation Organisation (ICAO). Whereas the country's aviation security remains largely safe and stable, aircraft accidents and other aviation security incidents have continued to be experienced. During the period under review, the country witnessed aviation incidents, the majority of which comprised bird strikes. Most of the bird strikes occurred at the Jomo Kenyatta International Airport (JKIA), largely attributed to the existence of dumping sites along the flight path.

Additionally, three (3) fatal aircraft accidents were recorded within Kenya's airspace during the reporting period. These include: the 19th August, 2026 Mt. Ololokwe Helicopter crash in Samburu County, which claimed seven (7) lives, including five (5) American tourists, the Director General of Ecuador's National Intelligence Centre and the pilot. Earlier, on 28th February, 2026, another helicopter crash in Mosop, Nandi County, killed six (6) people, including the late Johanna Ngeno, former Member of National Assembly, Emurua Dikirr. Additionally, a plane crash in Shabashe Hills, Kwale County, on 28th

October, 2025, killed all 11 people on board, including eight (8) Hungarian tourists, two (2) German tourists and a Kenyan pilot.

Other than the air accidents, the country also contended with security breaches, including cases of unaccompanied luggage and illegal access of restricted areas during the period under review. Notably, on 15th October 2025, a large crowd of mourners breached security barriers and entered the State Pavilion at Jomo Kenyatta International Airport (JKIA) as the body of the late Raila Odinga arrived from India aboard Kenya Airways flight KQ203. This temporarily disrupted operations at the facility. Moreover, the strike by the Kenya Aviation Workers Union (KAWU), between 30th August 2026 and 1st September 2026, mainly over stalled collective bargaining agreements and staff welfare concerns, disrupted air transport in the country.

The Government, in efforts to ensure aviation security and ensure uninterrupted air transport operations, undertook the following measures;

a. Conducted security audits, inspections, system tests, investigations, and risk assessments involving airports, airlines, cargo agents, catering operators, ground handlers, and other aviation stakeholders, in line with domestic regulations and international standards.
b. Enhanced deployment of equipment and personnel to bolster security in the country's airports.
c. Strengthened coordination among all security agencies by enhancing inter-agency collaboration, communication, and command and control arrangements during high-profile events.
d. Sustained continuous aviation security awareness campaigns targeting airport workers.

e. Resolved the KAWU strike, leading to resumption of normal air transport operations.

Despite the measures taken, the following challenges continue to undermine Government efforts to ensure aviation security:

a. Prevailing infrastructural gaps, manifest in increasing congestion, especially in the JKIA.
b. Recurrent labour unrest.
c. Evolving technological threats, largely associated with advancements in Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAVs).
d. Unregulated urban real estate development and poor waste disposal, leading to encroachment of flight paths and increasing incidents of bird strikes.
e. Unresolved land ownership disputes.

Going forward, the Government commits to:

a. Continue expanding the JKIA and modernise the airport facility to enhance efficiency, bolster security and improve travelers' experience.
b. Sustain intelligence-led multi-agency coordination to enhance operational efficiency and security in Kenya's airports.
c. Strengthen enforcement of relevant laws and regulations and ensure compliance with international aviation standards.
d. Sustain continuous aviation security awareness campaigns targeting airport workers to minimise vulnerabilities which may be exploited by criminals.
e. Progressively address aviation workers' grievances to ensure uninterrupted air operations.
f. Strengthen regulation of urban development and management of waste disposal to ensure unobstructed flight paths and curb bird strikes.

g. Fast-track the resolving of land dispute matters.

1.28 THREATS TO FOOD SECURITY

The country' s food security situation remains relatively fragile, driven by erratic weather patterns, poverty, conflict and food inflation. Notably, the early onset of the long rains season in February 2026, affected land preparation, and heavy rains between February and April 2026 occasioned soil nutrient leaching, flooding of farms and pasture lands, as well as spread of diseases, which undermined crop and livestock production. Additionally, between May and August 2026 the country experienced above average temperatures and suppressed rainfall that affected crop and livestock production impacting on food security. The anticipated El Niño phenomenon may also heighten the risk of flooding during the October-December short rains season, with implications on food security.

To enhance food security, the Government has:

a. Implemented livestock off-take and agricultural insurance programs to safeguard livelihoods, enhance resilience to climate-related shocks and promote food security.

b. Sustained supply of subsidised fertilizer and other farm inputs.

c. Developed dams and irrigation infrastructure to reduce dependence on rain-fed agriculture.

d. Promoted food diversification to enhance dietary diversity, strengthen resilience to food supply shocks and improve food security.

e. Improved rural access roads and markets for farm produce.

Despite the measures taken the following challenges have continued to hamper food security in the country:

a. Climate change and erratic weather conditions which result to irregular rainfall, drought, and floods.

b. High cost of farm inputs which makes it difficult for farmers to afford quality inputs, leading to low productivity.

c. Pests and diseases reduce production and the quality of farm produce.

d. Limited use of modern farming techniques and technology, irrigation, and mechanisation resulting to low yields.

Going forward the Government will:

a. Invest and expand irrigation infrastructure in the country.

b. Continue subsidizing farm inputs and provide affordable fertilizers to farmers.

c. Ensure farmers' access to affordable agricultural credit.

d. Continue improving infrastructure by building and maintaining rural access roads, markets, driers, storage facilities, cold chain and food processing facilities.

e. Promote research and innovation by funding agricultural research.

f. Sustain national efforts to support climate-smart agriculture.

g. Improve market access by developing stable agricultural market environment and policies.

h. Enhance support for agricultural cooperatives to enhance farmers' bargaining power, access to better prices, and curtail exploitation.

1.29 REGIONAL AND GLOBAL SECURITY LANDSCAPE

The global security situation continued to be characterised by a convergence of major-power rivalry, protracted regional conflicts, technological disruption and

weakening multilateral security mechanisms. The international system is increasingly fragmented, with rising uncertainty over the effectiveness of traditional alliances and institutions in managing simultaneous crises. Intensified great-power competition is heightening strategic rivalry, hence shaping global security dynamics.

Similarly, protracted armed conflicts, including the Russia-Ukraine war, remain a major destabilising factor, while Middle East volatility involving State and Non-state actors heightens the risk of broader regional escalation, with implications on global energy markets and maritime security.

At the regional front, the security environment continues to experience protracted conflicts, creating a highly volatile and unpredictable security environment. The region faces persistent instability driven by insurgencies, coups, organised crime and growing geopolitical competition over resources and strategic influence, as discussed below.

1.29.1 Horn of Africa

During the review period, the political and security landscape in the Horn of Africa (HOA) remained volatile, characterised by intra-state and inter-state tensions, terrorism threats emanating from Al-Shabaab and Islamic State and political tensions, with elections taking place in Ethiopia.

Further, growing competition over access to strategic resources, maritime routes and geopolitical influence, particularly in the Red Sea and Gulf of Aden corridor continues to elevate the risk of interstate tensions and external interference in regional affairs.

Somalia

Somalia experienced heightened political contestation over the planned transition of the country from the clan-based election model to the universal-suffrage model. The widening political differences were fuelled by clan mobilisation, which heightened security

concerns following the expiry of the current administration's mandate in May 2026. The prevailing conditions are compounding the risk of structural volatility, with adverse implications on Kenya's national interests.

Ethiopia

Ethiopia held its General Elections on 1st June 2026, with the ruling Prosperity Party securing a majority win. However, concerns over challenges that hindered voting in Tigray and parts of Amhara and Oromia regions led to increased contestation of the election outcome, further exacerbating existing conflicts. These conflicts have disrupted economic activities, and heightened the risk of humanitarian deterioration through displacement and food insecurity with significant implications for the Horn of Africa, including potential refugee flows, cross-border arms trafficking, and increased tensions with neighbouring States over resource issues.

Sudan

Sudan remained volatile, with the Sudan Armed Forces (SAF) and the Rapid Support Forces (RSF), alongside their allied militia groups, sustaining hostilities. During the period under review, the Blue Nile remained a key conflict flashpoint, with both the SAF and RSF intensifying offensive and defensive military operations.

Meanwhile, both SAF and the RSF sustained parallel efforts to consolidate political influence with the prioritisation of territorial control, potentially increasing risks of the conflict spreading across the broader region.

South Sudan

South Sudan is scheduled for General Elections in December 2026, an event that could lead to heightened political contestation compounded by recent differences between Transitional National Government of South Sudan and Sudan People' s Liberation Movement in Opposition (SPLM-IO). This, coming in the backdrop of persistent conflicts in parts of the country, could have a spill-over effect on Kenya.

1.29.2 East Africa

Uganda

Uganda' s political and security environment remained stable, following President Yoweri Kaguta Museveni' s re-election in January 2026. However, there is increasing focus on succession politics. Meanwhile, Uganda faced an outbreak of Ebola during the period under review, raising concern over the potential spread of the disease to neighbouring countries. However, the situation has largely been brought under control.

Tanzania

During the period under review, Tanzania remained generally calm. However, the country continued to contend with domestic and international pressure to release incarcerated opposition leaders and initiate constitutional and electoral reforms after the October 2025 post-election violence. Whereas Tanzania is projected to remain calm, the clamour for constitutional and electoral reforms could sustain political tensions.

1.29.3 Great Lakes Region

In the period under review, the Great Lakes Region remained fragile amid persisting hostilities between the Armed Forces of the Democratic Republic of Congo and Congo River Alliance (AFC/March 23 (M23) rebels. Whereas international pressure on the warring parties bolstered compliance with ongoing peace talks and resolutions under the Washington and Doha-led peace processes, intermittent fighting persisted. The

competing external interests linked to mining are, however, likely to complicate conflict resolution efforts.

Meanwhile, intensified attacks on civilians by the Allied Democratic Forces/ Islamic State DRC, continued to undermine security in parts of Eastern DRC. Separately, the outbreak of Ebola Virus Disease in Eastern DRC, threatened public health and economic activities in the Great Lakes Region, besides complicating ongoing stabilisation efforts.

1.29.4 South Africa

Between April and June 2026, South Africa experienced a resurgence of anti-immigrant unrest and xenophobic protests, particularly in the provinces of Gauteng and KwaZulu-Natal, including parts of Durban. Community groups and vigilante mobs issued ultimatums demanding that foreign nationals vacate their businesses and residential areas by 30th June 2026. The unrest was characterised by intimidation, forced evictions, looting and destruction of foreign-owned shops, assaults on migrants, and disruptions to local commerce. The violence was driven by growing public discontent over unemployment, crime, pressure on public services, and competition for economic opportunities, with foreign nationals being blamed for the country's socio-economic challenges.

The developments had direct implications for Kenya, given the presence of a sizeable Kenyan diaspora in South Africa engaged in business, education, and professional employment, some of whom were repatriated.

1.29.5 Middle East

The Middle East conflict evolved into an interconnected regional crisis centred on the Iran- U.S.- Israel conflict, which created global energy volatility. Globally, the conflict resulted in supply chain disruptions, creating shortages in crude oil, liquefied natural gas,

jet fuel and fertilizer supplies, thus raising input costs for agriculture and amplifying food price pressures, with implications on other countries.

In Kenya, the U.S.-Israel-Iran war disrupted fuel supply and affected cargo flights, leading to reduced exports to the international market. The war in the Middle East also affected Kenyan diaspora remittances, food security, and Kenya's general national security.

1.29.6 Europe and the Americas

Kenya continued to maintain robust trade and diplomatic relations with countries in Europe and the Americas during the period under review. Notably, Kenya and the European Union (EU) unlocked duty-free, quota-free access to European markets, following the launch of the 10-year Economic Partnership Agreement (EPA) Implementation Strategy in June 2026. This was reinforced by Kenya's conclusion of several bilateral agreements with European countries, including France, Finland and Norway.

Kenya wound up its engagement in Haiti, during the reporting period, following the conclusion of the phased drawdown of Kenyan personnel deployed to the Multinational Security Support (MSS) Mission on 28th April 2026. This was occasioned by the United Nations Security Council resolution to transition from MSS to Gang Suppression Force (GSF). Regrettably, during the mission period, two officers were fatally injured while one remains missing. Kenya's successful completion of the mission elevated the country's global stature as a reliable partner in international peace and security.

The Russia-Ukraine war continued to impact Kenya through covert recruitment of Kenyan nationals to fight in the war and economic shocks. The protracted conflict also continued to exert pressure on Kenya to navigate the delicate balance between maintaining diplomatic relations and international partnerships, while ensuring sustained international market access. Relatedly, with geo-economic strategies in the West shifting

towards protectionism, Kenya actively pursued a balanced diplomacy to shield the country from disrupted supply chains and geopolitical rivalries.

The Government sustained efforts towards fostering regional peace and security, through;

a) Peace diplomacy and collaboration with regional and international partners towards resolving conflicts in the Horn of Africa and Great Lakes regions.

b) Provision of consular support, including orderly repatriation of distressed Kenyan nationals in various parts of the world.

Going forward, the Government commits to:

a) Reinvigorating peace diplomacy to advance conflict resolution efforts regionally and internationally.
b) Advancing strategic partnerships with regional and international partners to address shared security challenges.
c) Strengthening preparedness to emerging global and regional security risks.
d) Safeguarding Kenyans against exploitation by unscrupulous recruitment agencies through enhanced regulatory oversight.
e) Building economic resilience to international economic shocks through targeted investments in energy diversification and agriculture.

CHAPTER THREE: CROSS CUTTING MEASURES

2.1 RECOGNITION AND INTEGRATION OF VILLAGE ELDERS INTO GRASSROOTS ADMINISTRATION

Since pre-independence, Elders have served as an important link between their communities and the Government at the grassroots level. They work closely with law enforcement agencies to provide grassroots leadership, early conflict and dispute resolution, community intelligence, peacebuilding and communication between citizens and government.

The Elders have largely been offering their services voluntarily and the position has not had a fully standardised national framework for recruitment and remuneration. The Government has recognised and integrated 106,000 Village Elders, referred to as National Government Village Administration Elders (NGVAE), into grassroots national administration structure through the Village Elders Administrative Policy, at a budgetary allocation of Kshs. 3.9 Billion. The Policy has formalised and strengthened the role of the Elders as the first point of contact between Government and citizens at the grassroots level. This will bolster security at the grassroots by enabling early detection, reporting and response to security threats.

2.2 ESTABLISHMENT OF NAIROBI METROPOLITAN POLICE UNIT

The transformation of Nairobi into a global and regional social, political, economic, and diplomatic hub has heightened public safety and security concerns across the Nairobi Metropolitan Area, covering twenty-two (22) Sub-Counties of Nairobi and parts of Kiambu, Kajiado, and Machakos Counties. These concerns range from threats of terrorism, organised criminal gangs, cybercrime, transnational crime, street crime, drug and substance abuse, to the proliferation of SALWs. Achieving this will require effective cross-county coordination within the metropolitan areas.

The Nairobi Metropolitan Police (NMP) will enhance public safety, Police visibility, law enforcement and service delivery across the Nairobi Metropolitan Area. It will provide coordinated metropolitan policing to address cross-county security and public order challenges. In addition, the Unit will strengthen public order, traffic management, emergency response and promote multi-agency collaboration with county governments and other stakeholders.

The NMP will comprise NPS officers drawn from the Nairobi Region command establishment and officers drawn from the Nairobi City County Inspectorate Service.

2.3 ELECTION PREPAREDNESS

A secure, peaceful, and stable environment is a prerequisite for credible elections. Despite the Commission' s efforts to ensure a credible election process, a security threat assessment reveals that the electoral system faces sophisticated, multifaceted vulnerabilities that could undermine public confidence and disrupt the democratic process. Such disruptions could emanate from threats experienced during past general elections, including: political violence, hate speech, negative ethnic mobilisation,

cyber-attacks, climate-induced disruptions, transit and storage risks, and threats to electoral personnel, among others.

In response to the identified risks, the Government instituted the following key measures for the electioneering period:

a. Established a multi-agency framework which rolled out a robust National Election Security Plan (NESP) designed to proactively respond to the threats.
b. Established a decentralised command-and-control framework through the National Election Security Advisory Committee (NESAC) to synchronise intelligence sharing between IEBC field officers and county/subcounty security committees.
c. Sustained risk monitoring and early warning for conflict prevention in hotspot areas.
d. Sustained multi-agency crackdown on criminal gangs and goons.
e. Sustained efforts to build public trust in security institutions.

Going forward, the Government commits to undertake the following to ensure a secure electoral process:

a. Strengthen adherence to established transit protocols for all vehicles ferrying electoral materials.
b. Upgrade surveillance and access control measures at the National Tallying Centre, IEBC Warehouses, and county and constituency centres to prevent unauthorised entry.
c. Undertake training and capacity building of electoral officials in election security management.
d. Secure IEBC' s ICT infrastructure against cyber threats.

e. Provide security to key IEBC personnel.

2.4 THE JUKWAA LA USALAMA INITIATIVE

In alignment with constitutional principles, particularly the emphasis on public engagement in decision-making, the Government conducted a comprehensive stakeholder consultation to strengthen security and enhance service delivery at the community level. The engagement sessions christened *Jukwaa la Usalama* brought together a broad spectrum of stakeholders, including NGAOs, village elders, security personnel, County Governments, youth, student leaders, women, religious organisations, business groups, elected leaders and civil society representatives.

In addition, the *Jukwaa La Usalama* forums served as a Mid-Term Review (MTR) of the BETA within the security and administration sector, providing an opportunity to assess progress, identify gaps, and chart pathways for further improvement. The *Jukwaa la Usalama* report consolidated public views collected across all 47 counties on security, governance, and service delivery. The report highlighted major national security concerns including banditry, terrorism, organised criminal gangs, illicit brews, drug abuse, land conflicts, corruption, undocumented foreigners, and SGBV.

The *Jukwaa la Usalama* initiative achieved the following:

a. Connected grassroot stakeholders with County Security and Intelligence Committees and the National Government Administration Officers (NGAO).
b. Created an opportunity for the community to give feedback regarding government service delivery, programmes, projects and policies.

c. Informed the development of a comprehensive national framework outlining localised priorities, legislation, and multi-agency coordination models.
d. Reinforced and clarified the roles of local structures like the *Nyumba Kumi* initiative. It also revitalised the *Nyumba Kumi* structures.
e. Demystified the policing function and the need for information sharing in deterring or de-escalating crime and conflict.
f. Launched 100-days Rapid Results Initiative (RRI) to address the persistent challenge of illicit brews, unregulated alcohol distribution, and alcohol-related social harm.
g. Targeted operations to flush out criminal gangs across the country.
h. Re-energised multi-agency security crackdown to eradicate banditry and cattle rustling in the North Rift and parts of Eastern region where 2,394 illegal firearms and 4,273 ammunition have been surrendered.
i. Established a Government Chemist branch in Eldoret.

2.5 THE NATIONAL YOUTH OPPORTUNITIES TOWARDS ADVANCEMENT (NYOTA) PROGRAMME

The National Youth Opportunities Towards Advancement (NYOTA) Project is a five-year initiative by the Government. It seeks to unlock the potential of Kenya' s youth by addressing unemployment, expanding income-generating opportunities, and fostering a culture of savings and entrepreneurship. NYOTA Project plays a critical role in advancing the country' s youth-led economic transformation agenda by empowering young people to become active agents of national development, innovation, and long-term economic resilience.

The NYOTA project targets 820,000 unemployed youth, aged between 18-29 years and up to 35 years for Persons with Disability, countrywide, with Form 4 level of education and below.

During the reporting period, the Government scaled up implementation of the NYOTA Programme, significantly expanding economic opportunities for young people across the country. Key achievements included:

a) Strengthened youth entrepreneurship through structured business skills training, mentorship, and enterprise development support, thereby enhancing the sustainability and growth prospects of youth-owned businesses.

b) Expanded financial inclusion by increasing access to start-up capital while fostering a culture of savings and responsible financial management among young entrepreneurs.

c) Promoted equitable access to economic opportunities for young people, contributing to employment creation, improved livelihoods, and enhanced social and economic resilience in communities.

Over time, the NYOTA program has been a key pillar in empowering the youth and diverting their energies from crime.

2.6 AFFORDABLE HOUSING PROGRAMME

Kenya' s Affordable Housing Programme (AHP), a key pillar of the Bottom-Up Economic Transformation Agenda (BETA), has continued to drive the country' s development, addressing the critical housing deficit, while engaging a substantial number of youth in gainful employment. Notably, the AHP has directly absorbed over 600,000 young people across the country in several site roles, including construction, production of essential building components such as fabrication of windows and doors, as well as project

management and site logistics. Already, 8,807 housing units have been completed, and an additional 45,600 units are scheduled to be completed by December 2026, with over 270,000 units under active construction in various parts of the country.

Additionally, on-site apprenticeships under AHP are providing informal workers with formal practical trade experience in masonry, plumbing, electrical installation, and safety standards, improving their long-term employability. The AHP' s productive engagement of the youth and attendant income generation and skills upgrade has reduced the vulnerability of young people to recruitment into criminal groups and contributed to crime reduction. Notably, security officers have benefited from AHP through deliberate allocation of units, which has improved social welfare for the officers, enabling them to improve service delivery.

2.7 BEYOND VISION 2030 ECONOMIC TRANSFORMATION PLAN

The Government launched a national conversation on Kenya' s future beyond the expiration of Vision 2030 during the period under review. The conversation aimed at creating an inclusive, people-driven development roadmap, will be spear-headed by a multi-sectoral working panel which will collect expert opinions from the public and private sector, before drafting a proposal on the envisaged development blueprint dubbed Beyond Vision 2030 Economic Transformation Plan. It is anticipated that the proposal which will be subjected extensive public participation in the grassroots, including county assemblies, will ultimately be channelled to the National Assembly and Senate in the form of a development Bill, for adoption and enactment; and subsequent Presidential assent.

The process of developing the new development blueprint will build on initial expert proposals, including recommendations from a team led by Prof. Hiroyuki Hino and Governor Anyang' Nyong'o, aimed at transforming Kenya into an industrialized, globally

competitive high-income nation. The initial experts' proposals include anchoring the Beyond Vision 2030 Economic Transformation Plan on three (3) key pillars – Agricultural transformation, emphasising productivity and high value processing; Industrialisation through intensive manufacturing for regional exports; and Technology, innovation and knowledge economy.

Peace, security and national cohesion, as well as integrity, governance and state effectiveness are considered as key enablers and core foundational blocks of the new long-term national development plan. In particular, the security pillar prioritises modernization of security infrastructure and strengthening of community-police partnerships. Other enablers include; human capital development and social wellbeing; large scale infrastructure development and connectivity, supportive financial systems, environmental sustainability, climate resilience and natural capital; and regional integration and global competitiveness. The envisaged new development blueprint if actualized, has the potential to drive economic growth into the future and bolster security.

2.8 GOVERNMENT POLICY AND LEGISLATIVE AGENDA

During the period under review, the Government has been working on several policy and legislative initiatives to better improve the security landscape of the Republic. The initiatives are intended to ensure that the Government discharges its security obligations effectively and is responsive to any emerging issues.

2.7.1 Policy and Legislative initiatives

S/NO	POLICY INITIATIVES	CURRENT STATUS
1.	National Cyber Security Policy	The Policy has been drafted awaiting public participation before it is presented to Cabinet for

S/NO	POLICY INITIATIVES	CURRENT STATUS
		approval.
2.	National Government Village Administration Policy	The Policy is ready for presentation to Cabinet once approved by the National Treasury as the implementation will require significant resources.
3.	Policy on Critical Infrastructure Protection	The Policy has been drafted awaiting public participation before it is presented to Cabinet for approval.
4.	The National Policing Policy	The Policy has undergone internal stakeholder engagement and is awaiting public participation before being forwarded to Cabinet for approval.
5.	National Community Policing Policy and Guidelines, 2025	The Policy has undergone internal stakeholder engagement and is awaiting public participation before being forwarded to Cabinet for approval.
6.	Development of the National Public Order Management Policy, 2025	The Policy has undergone internal stakeholder engagement and is awaiting public participation before being forwarded to Cabinet for approval.
7.	The National Policy on Small Arms and Light Weapons	The Policy is currently undergoing public participation and stakeholder engagement before it is forwarded to Cabinet for approval.
8.	The Firearms Control and Management Policy	The Policy is currently undergoing public participation and stakeholder engagement before it is forwarded to Cabinet for approval.

2.7.2 Legislative Initiatives

S/NO	LEGISLATIVE INITIATIVE	CURRENT STATUS
1.	National Police Veterans and Fallen Heroes Bill, 2025	The Bill has been completed by the Office of the Attorney General awaiting forwarding to National Assembly.
2.	The Alcoholic Drinks and Drug Control laws (Amendment) Bill, 2025	The bill has been approved by cabinet. The Bill is undergoing some drafting changes by the Attorney General before being transmitted to the National Assembly.
3.	The Computer Misuse and Cybercrime Act (Cap. 79C) (Review)	A committee was established to consider all the necessary amendments to the cybersecurity laws and consider various court decisions in respect to the Act.
4.	The Critical Infrastructure Protection Bill, 2023	The bill has been drafted awaiting public participation before it is presented to Cabinet for approval.
5.	The Firearms (Amendment) Bill, 2024 – (*Review of Firearms Act 1954 Cap. 114)*)	The Bill is at the initial stages of Drafting.
6.	The Independent and Policing Oversight Authority (Amendment) Bill, 2025	The Bill has undergone stakeholder engagement and is awaiting Cabinet approval before being transmitted to the National Assembly.

S/NO	LEGISLATIVE INITIATIVE	CURRENT STATUS
7.	The National Crime Research Centre (Amendment) Bill, 2024	Stakeholder engagement and public participation was done. The Bill is undergoing some drafting changes by the Attorney General before being transmitted to the National Assembly.
8.	The National Forensic Science Laboratory Authority Bill, 2025	The Bill has been completed by the Office of the Attorney General awaiting forwarding to National Assembly.
9.	The National Police Service Act (Amendment) Bill, 2025	The Bill has been completed by the Office of the Attorney General awaiting forwarding to National Assembly.
10.	The National Police Service Commission Act (Amendment) Bill, 2025	The Bill is currently undergoing public participation and stakeholder engagement before it is forwarded to Cabinet for approval
11.	The Small Arms and Light Weapons Control and Management Bill, 2024	The Bill is currently undergoing public participation and stakeholder engagement before it is forwarded to Cabinet for approval
12.	The Strategic Goods Control Bill, 2026	The bill has been transmitted to the National Assembly
13.	The National Public Order Management Act (Amendment) Bill, 2025	The Bill has been completed by the Office of the Attorney General awaiting forwarding to National Assembly.

2.7.3 Subsidiary Legislation

No.	SUBSIDIARY LEGISLATION	CURRENT STATUS
1.	Development of the Private Security (Use of Animals in Security) Regulations, 2023	Undergone public participation, pre-publication scrutiny and stakeholder engagement. Regulatory Impact Statement has undergone public scrutiny and currently being reviewed pending submission to Office of the Attorney General for gazettement.
2.	National Government Coordination (Establishment of Administrative Units) Regulations, 2025	
3.	The Private Security (Fidelity Fund Operations) Regulations, 2024	Undergone public participation, pre-publication scrutiny and stakeholder engagement. Regulatory Impact Statement has undergone public scrutiny and currently being reviewed pending submission to Office of the Attorney General for gazettement.
4.	The Private Security (General) Regulations	Undergone public participation, pre-publication scrutiny and stakeholder engagement. Regulatory Impact Statement has

		undergone public scrutiny and currently being reviewed pending submission to Office of the Attorney General for gazettement.
5.	The Public Benefit Organizations Act Regulations, 2024	Passed by parliament in April 2026 and operationalised.
6.	The Prevention of Terrorism (Implementation of The United Nations Security Council Resolutions On Suppression of Terrorism) Regulations, 2026	Regulations passed by Parliament on 7th September, 2026.

CHAPTER FOUR: CONCLUSION

3.1 OVERVIEW

This Report has presented the State of National Security for the period 1 September 2025 to 31 August 2026, submitted to the National Assembly pursuant to Article 240(7) of the Constitution and Section 16 of the National Security Council Act. It has examined twenty-nine threat domains, the Government's response in each, and the regional and global environment within which those threats developed.

The overall assessment is that the national security environment during the period was stable but not improving. The country faced no single threat of a scale capable of destabilising the State. It faced instead a broad and persistent set of threats, several of which are changing in character faster than the institutional response to them. Stability was maintained. It was not consolidated.

3.2 THE THREAT PICTURE

Three patterns emerge from the assessment as a whole. The first is that aggregate volumes moved very little. Total reported crime rose marginally, by 580 cases or 0.6 per cent, against a broadly comparable figure for the previous period. That apparent stability, however, conceals a significant shift in composition. Defined offence categories including offences against the person, breakings, stealing and dangerous drugs among them — declined, while offences recorded as "Other Penal Code offences" rose by 2,673 cases, or 17.7 per cent, and now account for approximately one in every five reported crimes. Excluding that residual category, reported crime fell by some 2.5 per cent. Whether this reflects a genuine change in offending or a change in recording practice cannot be determined from present data, and it warrants examination in the coming cycle.

The second is that the most consequential threats are those that have changed form rather than scale. Organised criminal gangs have become instruments available for hire in political and commercial disputes rather than purely predatory street formations. Cattle rustling has evolved from a communal practice into organised, commercially driven crime, accounting for 84 fatalities, 99 injuries and the loss of over 19,000 head of livestock. Insecurity in learning institutions affected 421 institutions, a 53 per cent increase on the previous period. Femicide continued to rise in identified hotspot counties even where broader indicators improved. In each case the threat has migrated into a form the existing response was not designed for.

The third is that the principal drivers of insecurity remain socio-economic and structural: youth unemployment, weak community confidence in law enforcement, porous borders, and a digital environment that outpaces the State's regulatory reach. These are not policing problems and cannot be resolved by policing means alone.

3.3 ASSESSMENT OF THE NATIONAL RESPONSE

The Government's response during the period was substantial and, in several areas, institutionally significant. The establishment of the Nairobi Metropolitan Police Unit, the Anti-Abduction Unit within the Directorate of Criminal Investigations, the Counter Organized Immigration Crimes Unit and the National Cybersecurity Agency each created capability where none previously existed. The Jukwaa la Usalama initiative, the recognition and integration of village elders, and the NYOTA programme extended the reach of the security architecture into communities in ways that enforcement alone cannot achieve. The release of Ksh. 2 billion in reparations to protest victims marked a significant commitment to accountability.

3.3.1 Two qualifications attach to this assessment

The first concerns legislation. A substantial programme of security sector Bills advanced during the period, but the great majority remain at stakeholder engagement, Cabinet approval or transmission stage, and few have been enacted. The reform intent is clear; the statutory effect is not yet realised. Until enactment, these instruments have altered nothing operationally.

The second concerns measurement. Across most domains, the response is reported in terms of activity — arrests made, operations conducted, officers deployed — rather than outcome. The Report is consequently better able to say what was done than what was achieved. Where case progression data exists, it should in future be carried through to charge and conviction, since disruption of criminal enterprise, not volume of arrest, is the measure that matters.

3.4 CONSTRAINTS

Certain constraints recur across domains and are therefore structural rather than sectoral. Community mistrust of security agencies continues to suppress reporting, which means the figures presented in this Report understate actual incidence by an unquantified margin. Records systems remain fragmented and substantially paper-based, contributing to case attrition. Forensic and digital evidence capacity has not kept pace with the evidentiary demands of modern investigation. Asset holdings across the sector are not comprehensively mapped, limiting rational deployment. And data collection across ministries, departments and agencies is not standardised, which constrains comparison between periods and between agencies.

These constraints are acknowledged here because they bear directly on the reliability of this assessment and on the feasibility of the measures proposed within it.

3.5 OUTLOOK FOR THE COMING PERIOD

The 2027 General Election will be the dominant determinant of the security environment in the period ahead. Party primaries, boundary review and voter registration will each concentrate political competition, and the patterns observed during this reporting period — political mobilisation of criminal groups, inflammatory rhetoric, and contestation over the conduct of public order policing — should be expected to intensify at those points.

Beyond the electoral cycle, four developments warrant close monitoring: the trajectory of regional instability in the Horn of Africa and the Great Lakes, and its implications for arms flows and displacement; the food security outlook, which remains fragile and exposed to the forecast performance of the October– December short rains; the continued expansion of cyber-enabled crime beyond current regulatory and investigative capacity; and the evolution of organised criminal groups into hired instruments of political and commercial interest.

3.6 PRIORITY ACTIONS

Arising from this assessment, the following are recommended as priorities for the coming period:

a. Complete the enactment of the pending security sector Bills and supporting policies, and report progress against a published timetable;

b. Establish a standardised data collection framework across all reporting ministries, departments and agencies, issued in advance of the reporting period, to place future assessments on a consistent evidentiary footing;

c. Extend performance reporting from activity to outcome, through routine capture of case progression from report to conviction;

d. Strengthen public order management capacity and its accountability framework ahead of the 2027 electoral cycle;

e. Disaggregate residual crime categories to restore analytical visibility over the largest single component of reported crime;

f. Accelerate investment in forensic, digital and cyber investigative capability; and

g. Sustain and expand socio-economic interventions addressing youth unemployment, as the principal structural driver of insecurity.

3.7 CONCLUDING STATEMENT

The period under review demonstrated the resilience of Kenya's security institutions and their capacity to respond to a wide and evolving range of threats without significant disruption to national stability. That resilience should not be mistaken for sufficiency. The threats described in this Report are becoming more organised, more technologically enabled and more closely entangled with political and economic interests, while the instruments available to counter them remain, in important respects, incomplete.

The coming period, dominated by the approach of the 2027 General Election, will test the security architecture more severely than the one just concluded. Meeting that test will depend less on the volume of operational activity than on the completion of reforms already in train, the strengthening of institutional capability, and the restoration of public confidence in the agencies charged with protecting it.